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ABSTRACT
The theoretical debate over the ability of parties and leaders in the House of
Representatives to influence legislative decision-making is at the center of much of the
literature on Congress. On the one hand, the Procedural Cartel perspective argues that
while the tools used by the majority party leadership to assure the triumph of its
preferences may vary depending on the institutional context, the basic ability of the
leadership to impact legislative outcomes remains consistent. In contrast, Conditional
Party Government (CPG) theory posits that any power the majority party and its
leadership possesses over legislative decision-making is directly conditioned upon the
amount of agreement within the majority party caucus as to collective goals, as well as
the amount of ideological polarization that exists between the majority and minority
parties. This thesis provides an original test of these two theoretical perspectives by
evaluating their comparative ability to account for the proposal and passage of
limitation riders on the House floor during the annual appropriations process since the
1980s. Limitation riders provide a good vehicle to test theories of congressional
voting as they often have important policy implications in areas of significant
controversy. In addition, the extent to which the individual members or legislative
parties are able to successfully utilize limitation riders as a means of making
substantive policy is indicative of larger patterns of committee or party domination of
the floor process.
After reviewing the relevant literature on congressional decision-making, this
analysis proceeds to outline the theoretical predictions that the Procedural Cartel and
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CPG perspectives make regarding limitation riders. An original dataset comprised of
over 800 limitation riders from the 97th through the 110th Congresses is analyzed both
with respect to overall proposal and passage rates as well their party of origin. This
study finds that while the CPG perspective is best able to account for what occurs
during periods of low polarization and cohesion, Procedural Cartel provides the most
accurate prediction of what occurs when polarization and cohesion are high. These
findings suggest that, although these theories both have some ability to account for
congressional decision-making on the House floor, both of these frameworks need to
be revisited so that they can accurately account for what occurs during floor phase of
the legislative process.
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Introduction
The theoretical dispute over the way that political parties impact legislative
processes and outcomes is at the center of much of the literature on decision-making
in the U.S. House of Representatives (Sinclair 2002). Proponents of the Procedural
Cartel thesis argue that the tools to influence decision-making outcomes are almost
always controlled by the majority party and its leadership, who use them positively to
control the agenda and negatively to assure voting discipline (Cox and McCubbins
2005; 2007). Although the leadership’s propensity to use agenda control versus voting
discipline is dependent upon the institutional context that exists within the House at
that time, majority party control over the legislative process is always present to some
degree. An alternative framework is offered by Conditional Party Government (CPG)
theorists, who posit that the institutional context conditions whether or not party
government exists (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Rohde 1991). According
to this perspective, the majority party leadership is able to influence policy outcomes
when there is widespread agreement as to policy goals (intra-party cohesion) and
significant ideological distance between the two parties (inter-party polarization);
absent these circumstances, influence over the legislative process shifts to the
committees where the chairs are able to exert control over the legislative agenda, both
within the committees and on the House floor.
While some scholars test these theories by analyzing voting behavior on the
House floor to identify historic trends in party influence over voting outcomes (see,
for example, Cox 2001; Cox and Poole 2002; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2002;

2
Poole and Rosenthal 1997), others evaluate the extent to which shifts in partisan
behavior are attributable to institutional change (see, for example, Lowry and Shipan
2002; Roberts and Smith 2003). A third approach involves examining the interaction
between the House committees and floor processes, either by conducting broad
analyses of the level of cohesion in committee and floor policy output (Londregan and
Snyder 1994; Maltzman and Smith 1994) or by evaluating the extent to which the
committees are bypassed by the House leadership during the legislative process via
procedural measures and rules changes (Aldrich and Rohde 2009; Schickler and Rich
1997).
This research provides a novel way of testing the comparative explanatory
power of the Procedural Cartel and CPG approaches by evaluating the ability of each
perspective to account for the historic rate of proposal and passage of limitation riders
from appropriations legislation on the House floor. Limitation riders provide a good
vehicle to test party-based theories of decision-making as they often have important
policy implications in areas of significant controversy (Oleszek 2007). In addition, the
extent to which members of the majority and minority party are able to successfully
utilize limitation riders as a means of making substantive policy is indicative of larger
patterns of party or committee dominance over the legislative process. Although a
number of studies (see, for example, Carper 1960; Davidson 1983; Devine 1987) have
detailed the procedural history or policy effects of certain limitation riders, there has
yet to be a systematic examination of the aggregate number of riders that are proposed
each Congress, as well as changes in trends of partisan sponsorship.

3
The following analysis takes place in five parts. The first chapter begins by
reviewing the relevant theories on parties, leadership and congressional decisionmaking and details their development beginning in the 1960s through the more
modern perspectives which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Contrasts are drawn
between the CPG approach, which argues that the amount of power that parties and
leadership wield is determined by the institutional characteristics that exist at that
time, and the Procedural Cartel perspective, which posits that party and leadership
power has been a consistent influence on decision-making outcomes across modern
Congresses. This chapter then proceeds to outline the changes that have occurred
during the twentieth and early twenty-first century in the structure of the House and
how the Procedural Cartel and CPG approaches account for these changes. While
proponents of both theoretical perspectives tend to agree that the institutional changes
during the past century have been significant for the development of stronger party
leadership, these theories have conflicting perspectives on the opportunities for the
exercise of party power that existed before and after the reform era.
In chapter two, after a brief overview of the appropriations process, the
development of institutional mechanisms to manage appropriations since the Civil
War era are detailed and compared to larger patterns of institutional change. This is
followed by a discussion of the definition, origin and impact of limitation riders on
annual appropriations, as well as a review of the previous scholarship on this topic.
The argument contained within this section is that, because of their impact on agency
rules and practices, limitation riders are an effective way for individual members and
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the parties to make policy changes that circumvent the authorization process, as well
as serving as a tool for the minority to take positions and improve their electoral
success. Based upon this view of the purpose of limitation riders, this chapter then
extrapolates both the parallel and contrasting theoretical predictions of the Procedural
Cartel and CPG perspectives regarding limitation rider proposal and passage on the
House floor, derived from their conceptions of the potential strength of the party
leadership and the tools at the majority’s disposal during varying conditions of
cohesion and polarization.
Chapter three utilizes a dataset of limitation riders from the 97th through the
110th Congresses to test the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives. After a
description of relevant methods and the hypotheses generated by each theory, the
aggregate and partisan proposal rates of limitation riders are evaluated via descriptive,
cross-tab and logistic regression analysis. This analysis finds that the similar
predictions made by the two theories related to the aggregate number of limitations
proposed on the floor each Congress, as well as their aggregate and partisan pass rate,
receive strong support within the data. However, while CPG receives the strongest
support during the Congresses with low polarization and cohesion, the data from the
Congresses with high polarization and cohesion more closely conforms to the
Procedural Cartel predictions.
Finally, in chapter four, the implications of the findings of the limitation rider
analysis, alternative explanations and areas for further research are discussed. The
major finding of this study, that both the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives are
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unable to fully account for the amending activity during circumstances of both high
and low inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion, suggests that both of these
theories bear reconsideration. In the area of alternative explanations, the Pivotal Voter
perspective, where limitations are used to shift the ideal point of appropriations
legislation in order to gain the ‘pivotal vote’ for passage, requires further examination
that is outside the scope of this study. Additional explanations related to inter-branch
bargaining during divided government or other elements of the legislative context are
also possible but require additional evaluation. Research in the areas of the impact of
rules and policy-type on patterns of rider proposal and passage, as well as what tends
to occur within the committee context would also be potentially fruitful. This chapter
concludes that although further research is needed to clarify the extent to which the
basic tenants of the Procedural Cartel and CPG theories need to be revised, it is clear
that both of these perspectives on the influence of parties on decision-making in the
House need to be revisited.
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Chapter One: Partisan Accounts of Congressional Decision-making and the
Historical Development of the Postreform House
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical basis and broad
historic perspective for the analysis of limitation riders that will occur in the latter
parts of this study. This chapter begins by generally reviewing the historical
development of party-based theories of congressional decision-making and how they
led to the development of the CPG and Procedural Cartel perspectives. The CPG and
Procedural Cartel perspectives are then explained in detail, with particular attention
given to the contrasting accounts they provide of the kinds of power the party
leadership possesses, its source, and how institutional change impacts its exercise.
The second part of this chapter provides an overview of the structural evolution of the
the House since the beginning of the twentieth century and concludes with an
explanation of how the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives account for the
significance of these changes and why they occurred.
Party-Based Theories Overview
The CPG perspective on congressional decision-making belongs to a group of
theories which argue that the power of parties and leadership in the House of
Representatives is conditioned by the context in which decision-making takes place.
While early work on this topic (see, for example, Froman, Jr. and Ripley 1965) hinted
at the possibility that institutional variables could impact the amount of leadership
control and party influence that occurs on a given issue, it was not until the 1970s,
with the work of Fenno (1973) and Mayhew (1974), that a systematic approach to
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congressional decision-making outcomes theoretically rooted in institutional
characteristics and incentives began to emerge. Fenno’s (1973) study of committees
identified three basic goals that motivate member action—reelection, influence within
the House and making good public policy—and hypothesized that within this context,
political parties function as one of several environmental constraints on member and
committee activity. In contrast, Mayhew’s (1974) electoral connection thesis argues
that Members of Congress are predominately motivated by reelection and, due to the
weakness of institutional collective action incentives, are able to ignore the wishes of
their respective parties in the decisions that they make. Legislative parties can,
nevertheless, still be powerful due to their ability to utilize rules, budgetary and
taxation contexts to frame decisions in such a way that the preferred leadership policy
can potentially be victorious.
Cooper and Brady’s (1981) seminal study of leadership styles in the House is
the first of its kind to directly condition the type of leadership that emerges upon its
institutional context and, in this respect, is a direct predecessor to the CPG approach.
In their examination of the transition from the “hierarchical” style of Speaker Cannon
to the “bargaining” style of Speaker Rayburn, Cooper and Brady (1981) posit that the
institutional context is primarily determined by the external electoral environment.
When party strength is high, power is concentrated in the hands of leaders; when party
strength is low, power is dispersed and leaders hold more maintenance-oriented roles.
Elaborating on this approach, Brady, Cooper and Hurley (1987) argue that the degree
to which power can be concentrated in the hands of party leaders is itself dependent on
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the potential of the majority to act as a voting coalition. Members are naturally
resistant to party voting structures because they tend to contradict traditional concepts
of representation and impose limitations on individual activity, even when the
existence of a strong leader might be advantageous for collective action aims. Thus, a
substantial level of intra-party unity and inter-party conflict can exist at length without
manifesting a highly centralized power structure.
Another forerunner to CPG theory is the Principal-Agent approach. Developed
by Barbara Sinclair in the 1980s, this perspective theorizes that changes in leadership
functioning are best explained as a response to member expectations, which are
formed by their institutional and political environment (Sinclair 1983). The majority
party leadership is tasked with building winning coalitions on major legislation while
promoting intra-party harmony and the relationship between these two primary
functions conditions the leadership’s use of tools that the House and internal party
structure provide (Sinclair 1983). Because the aims of individual members can
conflict with the collective party goals, the potential influence of leaders over their
members’ behavior depends upon the amount that the leadership can impact a
particular member’s goal achievement (Sinclair 1983; 1995). If the party
membership’s preferences are highly dissimilar, it is likely that the leadership’s
pursuit some member goals will often conflict with the action that other party
members want to be taken (Sinclair 1986; 1995). Party members, therefore, must
collectively navigate tradeoffs between the delegation of executive power to better
facilitate collective action, and the equal distribution of power and resources which
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results in higher autonomy for individuals to pursue their legislative goals (Sinclair
1995). The implication of this is that the amount of power that the leadership
possesses is dependent upon the amount of agreement on collective aims that exists
within the caucus at that time (Sinclair 1983).
CPG theory was developed initially by Rohde (1991) and Aldrich (1995) in the
early 1990s. This perspective asserts that in the House of Representatives,
institutional motivations for party discipline are weak and because of this, the parties
and the chamber leadership are not inherently the dominant influence in the decisions
made by the collective membership (Aldrich 1995; Rohde 1991). Instead, the ability
for the majority party leadership to exercise control over the legislative agenda and its
membership’s voting decisions is conditioned by the amount that the majority and
minority parties are ideologically polarized, as well as the level of ideological
cohesion present within the majority party caucus (Rohde 1991). When polarization
and cohesion are low, the majority caucus is often unable to agree to legislative goals
and, as a result, power is centered in the committees, where small groups of legislators
and the committee chairs control the policy-making agenda with a high degree of
autonomy. These periods of time where the ideological cohesion and the consequent
voting cohesion of the majority party is low also provide opportunities for the minority
party to ally with ideologically similar factions within the majority party in the
committees and pass their own policy priorities. Effectively, this makes the
committees ideological “outliers” when compared to the preferences of the majority
party caucus.

10
As the amount of inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion ebbs and
flows, changes in the amount of majority party floor voting cohesion, the amount of
control that the committees wield and the success with which minority legislative
measures are able to be proposed and passed also occur (Rohde 1991). When
polarization and cohesion are high, a high degree of agreement as to policy aims exists
within the majority caucus and the majority party leadership is consequently
empowered by its membership to pursue those aims (Rohde 1991). The ability of the
leadership to influence decision-making outcomes in the direction that the party
caucus desires falls into two broad categories—agenda control and voting discipline—
both of which can be exercised in various forms during the committee and floor
processes (Aldrich and Rohde 1997). To control the committee phase of the
legislative process, the leadership controls committee appointments to assure
ideological alignment with the majority caucus and utilizes the tools of seniority
bypasses for committee chairs, multiple referrals and loyalty oaths (Aldrich and Rohde
2009). To control the floor phase of bill consideration, the leadership can engineer
special rules, extraordinary conference committee assignments and vote trades
(Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Rohde 2005). As inter-party polarization and intra-party
cohesion increase, the majority party’s consensus as to policy preferences and,
consequently, the party leadership’s ability to utilize the tools enumerated above also
increases (Aldrich and Rohde 2009). However, if polarization and cohesion again
begin to decrease, less agreement as to common policy goals exists within the party
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caucus and, consequently, the power of the leadership to pursue those goals also
decreases (Aldrich and Rohde 2009).
In contrast to CPG theory, the Procedural Cartel approach developed by Cox
and McCubbins around the same time period (1991; 1994) argues that institutional
bases of party power in the House of Representative exist unconditionally and are
based upon two types of “assets” that all members entrust to their respective political
parties: intra-legislative benefits such as human capital and seniority, and electoral
benefits such as the party label. Each individual member has the incentive to protect
the party label through coherent legislative action because of its value as an
information shortcut to voters. In addition, individual members also desire to accrue
human capital and seniority because of the advantages both provide for goal
achievement during the legislative process, which translate into the electoral realm.
Through the power that stems from control over these assets, the majority party caucus
and chamber leadership is able to facilitate and oversee the key legislative deals that
occur within the House by making the rules that govern the structure and process of
legislation (Cox and McCubbins 2007). In addition, both the committee system (via
control over appointments and the committee chairs) and the legislative process (via
control over the floor rules and scheduling) are controlled by the majority party
leadership so that bills containing policy changes that are opposed by the leadership
almost never make it onto the floor agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2002).
The Procedural Cartel framework conceives of the majority party leadership as
perpetually navigating the trade-offs between the two methods of influencing
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legislative outcomes—agenda control and voting discipline (Cox and McCubbins
2005). Although agenda control always exists at some level, this method is
emphasized during periods where party cohesion is weak because it enables the party
leadership to control floor outcomes by preventing unfavorable legislation from ever
being considered (Cox and McCubbins 2002). Voting discipline emerges as a more
frequently utilized leadership tool when party cohesion is strong (Cox and McCubbins
2005). This is not to say that the relative amount of power that the majority leadership
holds never fluctuates; rather, that control of legislative outcomes via agenda control
or voting discipline is a consistent element within the legislative process.
The development of the party-based literature on decision-making in the House
of Representatives has culminated in two contrasting accounts of majority leadership
influence over legislative outcomes. On the one hand, Procedural Cartel theory
emphases that while the exercise of party leadership power may differ through varying
levels of polarization and cohesion, the amount of actual power it holds is generally
consistent. In contrast, CPG theory posits that the actual power that the party
leadership possesses is conditioned upon the amount of polarization and cohesion
present within the institution at the time. The differences between these perspectives
are evident in the divergent theoretical explanations that each theory provides of the
pre and post reform changes that occurred in the House during the twentieth century.
Institutional Development in the House of Representatives, 1910-2010
The Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives both give analytic accounts of the
historic institutional development that has taken place within the House. Before these
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accounts are detailed, an overview of the significant changes that are relevant to each
theoretical perspective is provided within this section. Over the past hundred years,
the structure of Congress and the House in particular has experienced three periods of
significant internal transformation which were catalyzed by changes in the ideological
composition of its membership. In each case, the structural shifts were in the area of
procedural norms, which in turn impacted the amount of power that the party
leadership exercised in controlling legislative outcomes. While the location of these
shifts—whether they were internal to the parties or within the external institutional
context—varied, their effect on centralizing or disbursing the centers of legislative
influence was widespread.
The Era of Committee Governance
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Speaker had the power to appoint
legislative committees, served as the chairman of the rules committee and had
significant discretion over the recognition of members (Cooper and Brady 1981).
However, in the first few years of the twentieth century economic and social change in
the midwest and western regions resulted in the election of a new group of progressive
Republican members. The Speaker’s use of his powers to constrain these members
led to a revolt beginning in 1909, where the progressive Republicans allied with the
minority Democrats to strip the Speaker of his procedural ability to control the agenda
and committee appointments. Between 1909 and 1910, these changes included the
establishment of a Consent Calendar and the call of committees, removing the Speaker
from the Rules Committee, enlarging its membership and providing for their election
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by a floor vote of the House membership. During this time, a procedure was also
established through which individual members could initiate the discharge of bills
from committees and the House rules were amended so that the members and chairs of
the standing committees would also be elected by a floor vote.
Once the procedural and rules changes initiated by the revolt had been
implemented, the Speaker was left with little power to influence committee
assignments or control the agenda via the Rules Committee. In addition, the Speaker’s
ability to coerce or punish individual members also declined (Rohde 1991). Sinclair
(1995) describes the institutional cooperation mechanism that resulted from these
changes as “inter-committee reciprocity (23),” while the power of the committees and
chairs over the next fifty years broadened, the role for the floor and leadership
narrowed. The power of committees was particularly aided by their exclusive ability
to propose legislation, the procedural barriers to calling bills onto the floor, the
practice of reserved seats in the conference committees for senior committee members
and the lack of recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole, which discouraged
position-taking behavior on the part of individual members (Davidson 1981; Sinclair
1995). These advantages were underpinned by the rise of careerism in the House,
where low turnover assured that the typical tenure of a committee chair would be
lengthy (Davidson 1981). The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act also served to
expand the power of standing committees by reducing their number from 48 to 19,
increasing staff allocations and codifying committee jurisdictions to avoid disputes
(Deering and Smith 1997; Davidson 1990).
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The internal dynamics within the majority party during the era of committee
government were often acrimonious due to both the seniority system of selecting
committee chairs, which lessened the incentives for chairs to be responsive to the
wishes of the caucus, and the propensity of conservative southern Democrats to ally
with Republicans to pass their own policy priorities while blocking or altering much of
the majoirty caucus’ legislation in committee (Aldrich and Rohde 2009). Dyson and
Soule (1970) found in their study of the House during this era that the committees also
tended to be highly influential on floor outcomes, with the Democratically controlled
committee positions prevailing around eighty-four percent of the time while the
Republican controlled committee positions prevailed around seventy-five percent of
the time. Toward the end of the committee era of governance, problems began to arise
both within the Democratic majority and the committees themselves. Within the
caucus, the number of members from northern states began to grow, particularly as a
result of the 1958, 1964, 1970 and 1972 elections, while members from the south
continued to be closely aligned with their Republican counterparts (Sinclair 1985). In
addition, in the late 1960s friction between the committees and the majority party
caucus began to increase as the liberal majority in the caucus more often than not
disagreed with what the committee produced (Sinclair 1985). At the same time, the
jurisdictional competition among House committees and the necessity to coordinate
legislative deliberations was rising while long-standing conflicts between the
authorizing versus the “taxing-spending” committees began to impact floor
consideration of committee legislation (Davidson and Oleszek 1976).

16
The 1970s Reform Era
As a result of the growing institutional tensions and the greater homogeneity of
the majority party, momentum began to develop within the Democratic caucus toward
institutional change that would afford the liberal members a greater ability to influence
legislative outcomes. The ‘reform era’ in the House began with the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970, which provided for recorded votes in the Committee of
the Whole and resulted in committee decisions being more vulnerable to challenge on
the House floor (Davidson 1986). A year later, a change in internal party rules entitled
the “Subcommittee Bill of Rights” was passed, which removed the right of the chairs
to appoint the subcommittee chairs and gave it to the Democratic committee
membership (Rohde 1974). This change significantly strengthened the liberals within
the Democratic caucus by making this group immediately eligible for positions that
had previously been chosen by the more conservative committee chairs (Rohde 1974).
Further reforms that took place in 1973 and 1974 opened up conference committee
and markup session to public scrutiny (Unekis and Rieselbach 1984), required the
committee and subcommittee chairs to receive caucus approval for their continued
tenure, limited members to chairing no more than one committee each, provided for
regular meeting of the Democratic caucus and reinvested the Speaker with the power
to appoint members of the Rules Committee (Sinclair 1985). In 1974, the caucus
utilized its new powers to depose three committee chairs while the majority party
leadership began to act as mediators when disagreements between the committee and
the caucus took place (Sinclair 1985).
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Rohde (1991) identifies three tracks of institutional change that occurred
during the reform era of the 1970s: committee chair power was removed or restricted,
the influence of the party and leadership over the policy process was increased and the
institutional bases of power were vested in the party caucus. However, Oppenheimer
(1980) notes that these reforms had the effect of pulling the House in two seemingly
opposed organizational directions. While some of the reforms gave greater authority
to the subcommittees and provided for greater equality among House members via the
collectivization of power, others served to centralize decision-making by empowering
the party leadership (Oppenheimer 1980). These seemingly contradictory changes
were the result of a two-fold reaction to the power of the committee chairs before the
reform. On the one hand, the members of the Democratic Party caucus were
concerned with assuring that their preferences would substantively impact policy
outcomes and they therefore removed power from the committee chairs and vested it
in the subcommittees, where the more junior and liberal members of the caucus would
be able to influence the shape of legislation. However, the caucus also needed the
ability to coordinate legislative activity so that power would not again devolve to the
committee chairs, hence the centralization of power in the hands of the party
leadership.
While the impact of the institutional reforms that occurred in the mid 1970s
was often gradual, some of the results were more immediate. Beginning in 94th
Congress, an explosion in the number of floor amendments, many of which
engendered significant controversy, created coordination challenges for the majority
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party and had the overall effect of raising the amount of uncertainty in the floor
process (Smith 1989). The Democratic response to this was to again change the rules
in the 96th Congress to make it more difficult to require a publically recorded vote on
floor amendments and increased the use of restrictive rules to over three-quarters of
the time by the 98th Congress (Bach and Smith 1988; Smith 1989). The effect of these
changes was a steep decrease in the number of floor amendments successfully
proposed after the 97th Congress (Bach and Smith 1988; Smith 1989). Meanwhile,
another result of the institutional reforms for the committees was the growth of
multiple referrals, where the party leadership could refer a piece of legislation to more
than one committee and set time limits for its consideration (Deering and Smith 1997).
The consequent ability of the party leadership to choose which committee report
would be considered on the floor undermined committee autonomy in crafting
legislation while enhancing the ability of the party leadership to control the ultimate
policy outcome (Davidson and Oleszek 1992; Deering and Smith 1997).
Republican Rule and Early Twenty-first Century Developments
While party leadership power continued to grow during Democratic rule in the
1980s, with the Republican takeover in the 104th Congress, Gingrich went further than
any previous post reform Speaker in stripping committees of their power (Dodd and
Oppenheimer 2009). In the case of the Appropriations, Energy and Judiciary
Committees, Gingrich bypassed more senior members on the panels in the selection of
chairs, abolished three committees and reduced the seats available on the other panels
by twelve percent (Aldrich and Rohde 1997). At the same time, Gingrich cut
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committee staff allocations by one-third, eliminated the ability of the committee chairs
to proxy vote and term-limited committee and subcommittee chairs to six years of
service (Aldrich and Rohde 1997). The Republican leadership further undermined
committee assignment norms by giving a record number of freshmen seats on the
Rules, Ways and Means, Appropriations and Commerce Committees (Rieselbach
1995). Gingrich also consolidated his power over the floor process by opening it up
to more amendments (Davidson 1995), utilizing special rules to maintain control over
the proceedings (Aldrich and Rohde 2009) and was at least somewhat involved in
eighty percent of the measures that exited the committees (Sinclair 1999).
While Speaker Hastert initially promised a return to regular procedures, many
of the extraordinary practices that had occurred under Gingrich were continued.
Special rules were often employed to block Democratic floor amendments and
seniority bypasses were utilized to choose more conservative candidates for the
Appropriations subcommittee chairs (Aldrich and Rohde 2009). Change in partisan
control during the 109th Congress maintained many of the same patterns seen under
Republican rule. While Speaker Pelosi conducted only one seniority bypass, she did
not automatically let all of the chairmen of 1994 have their old committees back either
(Pearson and Schickler 2009). She additionally demonstrated her willingness to
employ special and closed rules to control the floor process and give preference to
party priorities, such as the “Six for ‘06” agenda items (Dodd and Oppenheimer 2009).
Finally, four out of the five new appointees to the Rules Committee were freshmen
and the exclusive designation was removed so that members could be given additional
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committee assignments as incentives to comply with leadership dictates (Aldrich and
Rohde 2009).
In summary, the trajectory of institutional change in the House over the past
century has vacillated between centralization and decentralization of institutional
power. While changes in the ideological makeup of the membership which led to
tensions within the current institutional arrangements were responsible for the initial
modifications, the consolidation of the reforms was dependent upon the continued
demand for the new structural arrangement. The era of committee governance
between 1920 and 1970 was ended because the composition of the majority party,
which had up until that point been ideologically heterogeneous, became cohesive
enough to initiate changes that would refocus power in the hands of the caucus and
leadership. The continued consolidation of party leadership authority through the era
of Republican rule in the 1990s and early twenty-first century has continued this trend
of centralization as the institutional arrangements that are conducive to the exercise of
party leadership power have been further entrenched.
Theoretical Accounts of Institutional Change
The Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives both evaluate the institutional
reforms that have occurred in the House of Representatives from the perspective of
changes in the exercise of party leadership power. While both theories agree that the
extent to which the party leadership has acted assertively to agenda-set and influence
voting behavior over time has varied considerably, these perspectives disagree as to
the actual causes and effects of the institutional changes for the absolute amount of
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power that the party leadership possesses. Procedural Cartel theory tends to interpret
the effect of the 1970s reforms as strengthening the ability of the party leadership to
position-take and to rely on voting discipline instead of agenda setting to impact
legislative outcomes. In contrast, the CPG perspective argues that these institutional
changes affected the actual amount of power that the party leadership possesses, by
either vesting or removing the basic ability to agenda set and influence voting
behavior.
In analyzing the changes in the House that occurred in the twentieth century,
Procedural Cartel theory emphasizes the continuity of certain key institutional traits
with respect to committee assignments, the seniority system and the ideological
alignment of committees relative to the majority caucus, which allows the committees
to be utilized for the purpose of agenda control. While norms have historically
constrained committee assignments, they have never removed the ability to use party
loyalty as a determinant of committee appointments (Cox and McCubbins 2007). This
was seen in the 104th and 109th Congress, where the Republicans ignored many norms
in placing freshmen on powerful committees (Cox and McCubbins 2007). Moreover,
the lack of seniority violations in the pre reform period does not mean that they were
impossible (Cox and McCubbins 2007). The stalemate between the regional
groupings of the Democratic Party during the 1940s through the 1960s caused each
group to focus on ensuring that their contingent had sufficient representation on the
committee, and not waste their energies attacking the members of the other wing (Cox
and McCubbins 2007). Likewise, the 1974 and 1994 seniority violations are
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exemplary of the importance of this tool and the power that the leadership possesses to
utilize it to maintain party discipline. In Cox and McCubbins’ (2007) study of
committee outliers, little evidence is found that they systematically exist in the
postwar era with only a few committees (Agriculture, Armed Services, Education and
Labor, Government Operations and Interior) being frequently unrepresentative of their
ideological or regional groupings. Additionally, Cox (2001) found that during the
committee process, moderate majority party members tend to dissent less than
ideologically comparable minority party members. In total, this lends support to the
theoretical proposition that the committee members act as agents of their respective
parties and do not tend toward widespread action that is contrary to the desires of the
majority party caucus.
When attempting to account for party leadership influence on voting behavior,
proponents of Procedural Cartel theory argue that the operationalization of “party
cohesion” as either the “number of party votes” or the “amount of party cohesion on
all votes” is problematic for testing theories of leadership influence (Cox and
McCubbins 1991). This is because these kinds of measures are not clearly related to
the activity of party organizations, which are generally selective about the number of
positions they take (Cox and McCubbins 1991). Instead, the number and results of
party leadership votes (defined as a vote where the party leadership took a position on
the outcome) is utilized to evaluate majority party agenda size and its level of success.
Whereas under conditions of caucus homogeneity, the party leadership takes more
positions and utilizes voting discipline on the floor to get its way, under conditions of
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caucus heterogeneity the party leadership focuses more on agenda control and takes
fewer positions (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007). In their examination of party
leadership votes in the postwar era, Cox and McCubbins (2007) found that, regardless
of the amount of caucus cohesion, when the party leadership took a position they
usually won out. Cox and Poole (2002) also found in the post-reform era that party
pressure typically takes place with votes on procedure, rules organization and those
that are “label defining” with less pressure generally occurring with other kids of
substantive votes. More generally, Forgette (2004) has found that across
circumstances of high and low cohesion in the postwar period, members’ attendance at
a party caucus meeting immediately prior to key congressional votes imposes a greater
level of partisan cohesion than would otherwise take place. Finally, in McCarty,
Poole and Rosenthal’s (2001) examination of members who switch parties, they found
that the ideal point of these individual members’ moves in the direction of their new
party even after the change has taken place. In total, the above studies indicate that
across centralized and decentralized institutional configurations, the party leadership
apparatus has influenced legislative outcomes in both significant and consistent ways.
Unlike Procedural Cartel theory, the CPG approach argues that the amount of
intra-party cohesion and inter-party polarization present within the House accounts for
both the institutional changes that take place and the amount of leadership that is
manifest. In their study of CPG levels in the House and Senate between 1876 and
1984, Aldrich, Berger and Rohde (2002) found that in both chambers, CPG is at an
almost constantly high value through the end of World War I. The House variable
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then steadily declines thereafter until about 1970, where it is resurgent through the mid
1980s. The historic similarity in CPG levels, it is theorized, is due to the role that
parties play in elections where the partisanship of the public affects the voting choices
that Members of Congress make (Aldrich, Berger and Rohde 2002). According to the
CPG perspective, the growing ideological homogeneity within the parties in the
electorate resulted in more cohesive and ideologically polarized parties in Congress,
which consequently enabled the 1970s institutional reforms. These reforms changed
the structure of the House so that conditional party government could operate as long
as the party was cohesively aligned around a set of desirable policies separate from the
status quo (Aldrich 1995). In the immediate aftermath of the reform, a number of
issues still split the Democratic caucus—particularly Civil rights, energy, environment
and defense policy— and CPG was not present on these issues until the 1980’s, where
the increased intra-party homogeneity enabled the leadership to create party policy
positions and utilize the tools of agenda management and institutional discipline to
help push the caucus agenda (Rohde 1991). This in turn led to the changes in
institutional norms such as multiple referrals, the greater use of restricted or suspended
rules and the greater interference of the Speaker in the committee process in order to
prevent the committees from being preference outliers (Rohde 1991).
Evidence supportive of the CPG perspective can be found in Young and
Heitshusen’s (2003) study of committee stacking, which found that the majority party
leadership was able to be successful in this practice more often after the House
reforms took place. Likewise, Bianco and Sened’s (2005) work utilizing the
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‘uncovered set’ found that polarization provides the majority party advantages in
terms of agenda setting, where the activity of party leaders can move legislative
outcomes considerably closer to the preferences of their caucus. The institutional
changes that took place under the new Republican majority in the 104th Congress,
where the simultaneous stripping of committee power and consolidation of leadership
authority during the committee and floor stages aligned with the predictions of CPG
regarding what occurs in high cohesion and polarization situations (Aldrich and Rohde
1997). The 104th Congress for these theorists additionally highlights the potential
importance of transitional periods where cohesion and polarization is high for
allowing leaders extraordinary levels of power to influence committee action and
resolve bill conflicts (Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Rohde 2005). Also notable during the
period of Republican Rule is the findings of Moscardelli, Haspel and Wike (1998),
that the ideological distance of majority party members from the Speaker was
statistically significant in predicting support of party building legislation.
While the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives both acknowledge that the
1970s reforms strengthened the party leadership’s ability to exercise power, they
disagree as to whether or not there was significant power present before the reforms.
Considerable evidence can be marshaled by Procedural Cartel theorists, who argue
that the consistency in committee ideological alignment, party leadership vote
victories, the influence of caucus proceedings and the ideological realignment of party
switchers all point to party leadership influence (in varying forms) across varying
circumstances of cohesion and polarization. On the other hand, the CPG perspective
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points to the changes in committee stacking behavior, the assistance of ideological
polarization in achieving the outcomes favored by the party leadership and the
increased activity of the leadership in consolidating its power as cohesion and
polarization increases, as evidence that institutional composition does in fact condition
the amount of actual power that the party possesses.
Conclusion
The strongest differences between the theoretical predictions made by the
Procedural Cartel and CPG frameworks are seen during periods of low party cohesion.
Procedural Cartel posits that when party cohesion is low, the party leadership will
maintain control of the policy outcome via the legislative agenda, the result of which
is that legislative proposals sponsored by the minority party will be less likely to make
it onto the agenda than the majority sponsored items, although the items on the agenda
from both parties will have similar rates of passage due to the lack of voting discipline
(Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007). CPG theory, however, predicts that when majority
cohesion is low a majority faction will ally with the minority party making it difficult
for the majority leadership to prevent many of the minority sponsored proposals from
being considered. In addition, the lack of majority party voting cohesion means that
the minority proposals have a better chance of passing a floor vote than under
circumstances where polarization and cohesion are high (Aldrich and Rohde 1997;
Rohde 1991).
The predictions of these two theories, however, also substantively contrast
when dealing with periods of high inter-party polarization and cohesion. Under these
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circumstances, Procedural Cartel theory argues that the leadership will switch tactical
emphasis from agenda control to voting discipline (Cox and McCubbins 2005). This
means the more minority proposals may be allowed floor consideration, but very few
will be successful. In contrast, CPG posits that once polarization and cohesion are
high, the majority caucus removes power from the committees and vests it with the
party leadership, who are then able to utilize both agenda control and party discipline
to control legislative outcomes. Effectively, this lessens the amount of minority
legislation that will be passed or even proposed while simultaneously assuring that
majority party priorities will survive floor consideration.
While premised on the basic concept that political parties and the party
leadership are able to impact congressional decision-making outcomes, the Procedural
Cartel and CPG perspectives nevertheless provide contrasting frameworks for
understanding the circumstances and ways in which this influence occurs. In the
following chapters, the competing theoretical predictions made by the Procedural
Cartel and CPG perspectives regarding party leadership control over the agenda and
voting discipline will be applied to the floor consideration and passage of limitation
riders in the House of Representatives during the post reform era.
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Chapter Two: Limitation Riders and the Congressional Appropriations Process
This chapter utilizes the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives described in
the previous section to derive a set of complimentary and competing predictions about
the proposal and passage of limitation riders in the post-reform House of
Representatives. After a descriptive summary of the congressional appropriations
process, the first section of this chapter details the post Civil War institutional
development of appropriations procedures and practices. This is followed in the
second section by a substantive explanation of limitation riders, their role in the
appropriations process, and the way that they are utilized in both inter-branch and
partisan conflict. The third section examines the phenomenon of limitation riders as
floor amendments and develops the Procedural Cartel and CPG explanations for the
proposal and passage rates that should occur during each Congress under varying
conditions of inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion. This chapter concludes
by summarizing the predictions of each theoretical perspective and how they will be
utilized in the upcoming analyses contained within chapters three and four.
The Congressional Appropriations Process
Despite the procedural and institutional separation that exists between arenas
of substantive and fiscal policy-making within the congressional budgetary process,
decisions regarding the allocation of monetary resources directly impact the emphasis
which substantive policy priorities receive (Hartman 1982). Hartman posits that
because of this, “fiscal budget decisions not only reflect views about fiscal and social
policy but also are substantially shaped by electoral politics and by the processes of
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government (1982, 381)”. A further elaboration of this perspective is provided by
Stewart (1988), who notes that congressional spending decisions are dependent upon
the types of structures used to make them and these structures are chosen according to
the sorts of outcomes they are likely to create, both in terms of spending levels and
substantive legislative outcomes. The following section explores the structure of the
appropriations process, both descriptively and with respect to how electoral, partisan
and institutional pressures have influenced its evolution over time.
A Descriptive Overview
Federal budgeting is generally divided into four main phases: the preparation
and submission of the budget by the president to Congress, the congressional review
and response to president’s budget, the execution of budget-related laws by federal
agencies and the completion of agency spending audits (Oleszek 2007). Within the
second phase, Congress adopts a budget resolution in response to the presidential
recommendations regarding spending levels for various programs and agencies
(Streeter 2008). While this resolution never becomes law, the budgetary targets it sets
are often procedurally enforced as the House and Senate consider various measures
related to the budget, including appropriations and tax bills.
While most government spending is statutorily mandated, as in the case of
entitlements and interest payments on the national debt, the discretionary part of
spending is handled via the appropriations process. There are three types of
appropriations bills that Congress passes to allocate discretionary funds: regular
appropriations bills, continuing resolutions and supplemental appropriations measures
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(Streeter 2008). Regular appropriations legislation, where the funding for the federal
agencies is typically grouped into thirteen appropriations packages, is divided into a
series of sections that generally concern an individual budgetary account. These
measures provide detailed directions to the departments and agencies continued within
the bill on the distribution of funding among the various activities or programs that are
funded within an account. Regular appropriations legislation can also provide transfer
authority to the agencies to move budget authority from one account or fund to
another. When there is a delay in enacting a regular appropriations bill so that the
yearly budgetary deadline lapses, continuing resolutions are utilized to maintain
temporary funding for agencies and programs until the regular bills are enacted.
Finally, supplemental appropriations provide funding for unforeseen needs or increase
funding for previously authorized programs.
The distinction between authorizations and appropriations, both in terms of
purpose and temporal ordering, is important to keep in mind. While the authorization
process is utilized to establish, continue and modify programs or policies,
appropriations is utilized to fund programs or policies that have been previously
authorized. Because it is procedurally prohibited to pass an appropriation for which
there is no authorization, the authorization committees are typically considered the
policy-making centers of Congress (Oleszek 2007). In contrast, the Appropriations
Committees are vested with five main duties (Shuman 1992, 75):
1) Examine the caps for the ceilings set by law and compare them to the
president’s budget,
2) Divide allocations between discretionary and statutory spending,
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3) Produce and pass law related to the thirteen regular appropriations bills and
any supplementary bills,
4) Produce continuing resolutions which temporarily extend funding until the
regular appropriations bills are enacted and
5) Oversee the agencies and programs under its jurisdiction.
For each authorized program and agency subject to the annual appropriations process,
the Appropriations Committee, has three main options: to provide all the funds
recommended in the authorization bill, provide a reduction in the amounts authorized,
or refuse to provide any funds at all (Oleszek 2007).
Historical Development
The evolution of what would become the modern appropriations process
described in the previous section began in 1774 with the passage of two general
appropriations bills (Fisher 2003). While the process was initially slow to develop,
expansion into all areas of discretionary spending began during the 1830s (Fisher
2003). Separate committees to handle appropriations were not created, however, until
the Civil War era, when the high level of spending necessary for the war effort
required greater coordination than could be collectively provided on the floor (Fisher
2003).
In the period immediately following the conclusion of the Civil War, tensions
gradually developed between the Appropriations Committee and the House members,
who wanted greater expenditures for their own districts (Brady and Morgan 1987) as
well as between the Appropriations and authorizing committees, who felt that their
jurisdiction was being encroached upon (Fisher 2003). These areas of dissatisfaction
led to a stripping of power from the Appropriations Committee and the delegation of
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appropriations authority to the authorizing committees between 1877 through 1885
(Fisher 2003). The fragmentation of appropriations power resulted in higher levels of
governmental spending and the responsibility to constrain the budget began to rest
with the Speaker, who could enforce fiscal discipline by refusing to recognize
members who intended to introduce additional spending for floor consideration
(Fisher 2003). In 1920, however, after the revolt against Speaker Cannon, the House
reconsolidated jurisdiction over appropriations into a single committee, an action
which the Senate followed in 1922 (Fisher 2003).
Before the reform era of the 1970s, the only major changes to the budget
process occurred via the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, which established a
joint budgetary committee to prevent the authorization committees from spending via
borrowing authority, and through the gradual use of omnibus appropriating during the
1950s (Fisher 2003). Although the pre-reform era was generally characterized by
extensive committee autonomy, action on the part of the Appropriations Committee
membership during this period tended to be constrained to some degree by the
expectation that it be responsive to the wishes and sentiments of fellow House
members, as well as the high level of involvement of the party leaders in committee
assignments (Fenno 1973). While the chair had the use of procedural tools within the
floor process to deter changes to the committees’ legislative product, the committee
eventually had to share control over the legislative outcome with the party leadership
(Fenno 1966).
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During the period of institutional reform that occurred in the 1970s, Congress
passed the 1974 Budget Act. The major provisions of this act formed a budget
committee in each chamber with responsibility for drafting the congressional budget,
created the Congressional Budget Office to analyze and furnish budget information,
and mandated a budget timetable for each fiscal year (Palazzolo 1992). The purpose
of the budgetary reforms was in line with the larger institutional reforms that took
place during this period, which shifted control over policy outcomes from the
committees to the party leadership, who could then coordinate the budgetary process
so that the outcome was in line with the majority caucus’ priorities (Thurbur 1992).
While this shift in power over appropriations from the committee to the leadership was
gradually realized during the 1980s, as party control consolidated, these changes more
rapidly led to the transference of policy debates into the fiscal realm, where resource
allocation became influenced by partisan and ideological conflicts and resulted a
higher degree of party voting on budgetary items (Patashnik 2005).
Between the early 1980s through the late 1990s, more changes in budgetary
procedure took place, such as the gradual utilization of multiyear budgeting (Hartman
1982) and the increasing use of restrictive rules and omnibus legislating (Smith 1989),
which allowed the Appropriations Committee to recover some autonomy that had been
lost in the early reform era. Notable changes in law during this period included the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Acts of 1985, which established declining annual deficit
targets (Fisher 2003) and the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, which sought long-range
budget control through greater centralization of the congressional budget process
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(Thurbur 1992). An additional parallel development was the increasing use of the
congressional budget process by the majority party to quickly fulfill campaign
promises and circumvent issues with divided government, particularly during the
Clinton administration, with both deficit reduction and Medicaid reform being passed
in this way under the Republican majority (Sinclair 1997).
The development of the appropriations process that began during the Civil War
and continued through the pre reform era was due to factors both internal and external
to Congress. The heightened majority party cohesion in the 1880s was partially
responsible for the collective ceding of control over appropriations to the party
leadership, where it was believed that centralized direction over the process would
better assure that the spending priorities of the majority caucus’ were being fulfilled
(Fenno 1966). Likewise, the decrease in party cohesion forty years later led to the
reinstatement of power to the Appropriations Committee, which was in line with the
broader reforms empowering committees that were taking place within the House at
that time (Fenno 1966). Stewart (1989) also notes that in addition to the heightened
spending the occurred during the Civil War, which necessitated the creation of a
budgetary apparatus, the changing nature of partisanship was also important in
accounting for the later changes to the budgetary structure. Before 1896, the parties
were focused on controlling the administrative apparatus of government by building
and maintaining patronage via appropriations to government agencies (Stewart 1989).
In addition, during the periods of divided government that occurred between 1865 and
1921, the power of the congressional majority over appropriations was utilized to
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control opposition executives and gradually led to increased budgetary struggles
(Stewart 1989). The decision to reinvest power within the Appropriations Committee
was necessary to counterbalance the growing executive influence over spending that
stemmed from the 1921 Budgetary Act, which delegated to the president the
responsibility to propose the budget (Stewart 1989).
The major budget acts that were passed during and after the reform era have
generally been designed to make it easier for legislative majorities to convert their
spending preferences into law (Patashnik 2005). For example, the Budget Act of 1974
made the budget committees responsible to the majority party caucus by mandating
that members be hand-picked by the leadership with tenure and seniority norms no
longer being applicable (McCubbins 1990). Although the Speaker was never given a
formal role in the process, he was able to become involved in the policy-making at the
committee stage as well as negotiate budget agreements with the president and Senate
leadership (Palazzolo 1992). Changes in committee relations with the majority and
minority caucuses were also apparent in the aftermath of the reforms, where floor
amending activity to appropriations bills grew from a low of 14 being proposed in
1965, to over 140 in 1980 (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). However, the House
Appropriations Committee still retained some ability to shield their legislation from
floor amendments, by reporting bills with discretionary amounts up to the limits of
their spending allocations (Forgette and Saturno 1994).
There were also changes in the internal dynamics of the Appropriations
Committee during the post-reform era. While pre-reform, the committee avoided
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taking roll calls in order to aid collegiality and lessen opportunities for members to
take partisan positions against one another, in the post-reform period, the number of
amendments on which subcommittee chairs and ranking members took opposite sides
increased (Gordon 2005). Committee discord increased in the 104th Congress due to
Gingrich’s use of the Appropriations Committee to achieve his policy agenda,
beginning with the violation of the seniority norm to appoint Livingston (D-WV) as
chair due to his high level of partisan loyalty (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). The
appointment of sub-committee chairs only upon the signing of a loyalty pledge to the
party leadership and the opening of conference committee and markup meetings to the
press also acted to silence attempts at compromise and encourage partisan behavior
(Gordon 2005).
Stewart’s (1989) observation that the structure of budgetary decision-making is
chosen based upon the outcomes it is likely to create has been reflected in the
evolution of the appropriations process detailed in this section. Additionally, in many
respects both the historic growth and contraction of Appropriations Committee
strength parallels larger patterns of institutional development that occurred at the same
time. During periods when the Speaker was particularly powerful and the institutional
mood was in favor of centralization, there tended to be less power vested in the
Appropriations Committee; when institutional power was more decentralized, the
Appropriations Committee was stronger and more impervious to outside influences.
Despite the greater levels of autonomy that the committee enjoyed in the 1980s, under
the current institutional configuration the appropriations process has increasingly been
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utilized by the majority party leadership as a tool to achieve its own policy agenda.
With the increase in policy implications of budgetary decisions, the importance of the
procedural tools that exist within the appropriations process for both the majority and
minority party to achieve more substantive ends have been greatly amplified. The
following section explores the policy-making potential of one such appropriations
tool, the limitation rider, and details the development and changing motivations behind
its utilization across a variety of institutional arrangements.
Limitation Riders
Within the appropriations process, one of the primary methods of creating or
influencing substantive policy is to attach a ‘rider’ to the text of the bill. Riders are
defined by Smith (1989) as amendments placed on appropriations bills during the
committee or the floor phase of the legislative process. A ‘legislative rider,’ which
changes existing law in some way, is usually prohibited unless it is protected by a
special rule or adapted by unanimous consent (Oleszek 2007). In contrast, ‘limitation
riders,’ which place temporary restrictions on the purposes for which spending is
authorized without altering existing law, are more generally allowable (Oleszek 2007).
Although these kinds of amendments differ in form, with limitation riders always
beginning with the language, “none of the funds provided in this act may be used
for…”, a more general distinction exists; whereas legislative riders tend to set
conditions on the use of appropriations, require a federal agency to make a
determination or take some action, limitation riders tend to be phrased in the negative,
are unconditional and entail no agency action (Schick 2007, 268).
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Historic Development and Procedural Rules
Bach (1983) describes the long-standing rationale behind the practice of attaching
limitation riders thus: “the concept of a limitation amendment may be understood as a
compromise between two principles: first, the separation of appropriations from policy
decisions (in the form of authorizations and other legislation); and second, the right of
Congress to decide not to appropriate for an authorized agency, purpose or program
(3).” During the 1820s and 1830s, legislative riders that added policy provisions were
frequently attached to appropriations bills, but were generally considered neither
procedurally nor substantively problematic (Fisher 2003). The attachment of
limitation riders to appropriations bills began in the 1870s, with subject matter often
involving war powers, federal supervision of elections and the extension of revenue
laws to the territories (Devine 1987). During the twentieth century, the use of
limitation riders grew and spread to many policy areas. For example, defense riders
were attempted to stop the closure of military installations under the Hoover
Commission during the 1950s (Carper 1960). Defense riders were also employed in
the 1990s to limit the way that Clinton could conduct foreign policy with respect to the
Balkans and Haiti (Wildavsky and Caiden, 2001). During the 1980s and 1990s,
foreign operations riders were used to forbid the funding of non-governmental
organizations that were politically supportive of abortion (Green 1993). In addition,
limitations on labor, education and health related appropriations know as the ‘Hyde
Amendments’ were an important legislative element that shaped early abortion policy
after the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973 (Davidson, 1983).
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Under the procedural rules governing appropriations legislation, limitation
riders are only allowable if they do not impose additional duties or burdens on the
executive branch, interfere with its discretionary authority or require officials to make
judgments or determinations about existing law (Oleszek 2007). During consideration
of limitation riders on the floor of the House, special rules can wave points of order
that otherwise could be made against the bill or one of its limitation rider provisions
that do not meet the above structural criteria (Bach 2003a). Conversely, it is also
possible that special rules can be utilized to protect certain sections against the
addition of limitation riders on the floor, or to allow the consideration of a limitation
rider that might typically be out of order (Bach 2003a). The House “germaneness
rule” (Rule XVI, clause 7) additionally impacts the floor consideration of limitation
riders by mandating that amendments on a subject different from the bill under
consideration are not allowable (Bach 2003b).
Besides the general procedural constraints on the proposal of limitation riders
on the House floor, Rule XXI(2)(d) places specific conditions on the way that this
kind of amendment is considered on the floor. The 1970s growth in floor amendments
can be at least partially attributed to the rise in the number of limitation amendments
being proposed on the floor (Smith 1989). Moreover, limitations were used
disproportionately by Republicans and Democratic conservatives who lacked votes in
the committee to pass their policy priorities (Smith 1989). Between the 96th and 97th
Congresses, a total of two-hundred and thirty-seven limitation amendments were
offered on the floor to be attached to appropriations bills (Sachs 1984). After the
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Democratic majority in the House was bolstered by the 1982 election outcome, clause
2(d) of House Rule XXI was passed, requiring that a member wanting to offer a
limitation must wait until all other kinds of amendments have been considered (Bach
2003b). After a bill has been completely read, a member may proposed a limitation
rider but the House can end the amending session via a successful “vote to rise”and
thus not consider this, or any other limitation (Bach 2003b). When this rule was first
enacted in 1983, the power to propose the motion to rise rested with the floor manager
(typically the subcommittee chair), which gave the committee when acting in concert
with the majority leadership the power to coordinate the prevention of unwanted
limitation amendments from being proposed on the floor (Smith 1989). However, in
the 104th Congress, this power was transferred to the majority leader or his designate,
effectively giving the majority leadership greater discretion over what amendments
will be allowed and removing power from the subcommittee chairs to block unfriendly
limitation amendments (Bach 2003b).
In his evaluation of the potential impact of House Rule XXI changes, Bach
(1983) predicted that it would result in an overall decrease in limitation amendments
and would ultimately facilitate closer cooperation between the leadership and
committee chairs in order to coordinate successful motions to rise. This prediction
was correct; in the 98th Congress, the number of riders proposed on the floor dropped
to a total of thirteen. Additionally, Sach’s (1984) analysis a year after this change
found that the pattern of limitation rider consideration on the House floor now fell into
four distinct categories: limitation riders that were precluded from consideration via
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successful motions to rise, limitations that were successfully considered and voted
upon despite attempts at a motion to rise, limitations that were protected by rules that
circumvented procedure, and finally, limitations that were never subjected to motions
to rise and thus could be successfully considered.
Legislative and Partisan Practices
Previous to this study, scholarly attention to the uses of and practices
surrounding limitation riders has been sparse, with almost all substantive work in this
area centered on normative concerns regarding the appropriateness of limitation riders
as a legislative tool. Arguing in favor of limitation riders, Sundquist (1983) posits that
limitations are a proper fallback for the legislative branch to restrain executive power.
However, Zellmer (1997) argues that limitation riders have been used to circumvent
long-standing policy that possesses broad support without public input or legislative
accountability. From a more intra-branch perspective, Devine (1987) further observes
that the appropriations process is not the proper vehicle for substantive policy-making
due to structural characteristics that prevent the full consideration or articulation of
policy in appropriations legislation. Finally, Sidak (1989) argues that attaching
limitations to appropriations bills frustrates the president’s ability to perform his duties
under the Constitution and might even constitute a violation of the prerogatives given
to the president in the exercise of his power under Article II.
While the above evaluations of the propriety of limitation riders provide some
insight in to their use, a more thorough evaluation is required to more fully understand
what motivates their proposal and passage in order to properly utilize them to test the
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Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives. The practice of attaching limitation riders to
appropriations legislation stems from long-standing patterns of inter-branch rivalry.
The appointment power of the executive and legislative branches, as well as the
effective threats of sanctions that each can make provides an inherent influence over
bureaucratic behavior (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989). However, issues
with delegation from legislative officials to the bureaucracy require a basic ceding of
control over aspects of policy implementation (Lindblom 1968). Due to nature of
inter-branch rivalries, lack of ideological alignment between the legislative and
executive branch often leads to lesser amount of decision-making authority being
delegated as each branch attempts to exercise the maximum influence possible over
agency structure and decision-making (MacDonald 2007). Limitation riders provide a
powerful legislative tool to influence agency decision-making and structure through
the denial of funds for specific purposes and provide an additional high-stakes way of
forcing the president to cooperate with the intentions of the legislature in agency
structuring and policy-making (Sundquist 1983).
Limitation riders can also be used strategically to shape legislation in a way
that impacts its likelihood of eventual passage. Individual legislators can,
theoretically, vote for riders in the hopes that their passage will cause the eventual bill
to fail (Melnick 1983). Moreover, individual members who would generally favor the
policy that the rider promotes vote against it if they are concerned that it will weaken
legal regimes in the long-term (Melnick 1983). Members of Congress also add
limitation riders to appropriations bills because the policies they contain cannot pass
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as free standing bills and this kind of legislation is unlikely to be vetoed over the
rider’s addition (Oleszek 2007). While these riders may sometimes trigger interbranch conflict, at a minimum they provide the congressional negotiators with a better
bargaining position (Oleszek 2007). An early example of such an attempt occurred
during the Reconstruction period, when the congressional Democrats attached riders to
appropriations bills to repeal various laws related to loyalty oaths and the deployment
of federal troops or marshals to polling places in the South, a policy-making attempt
that ran contrary to Hayes’ agenda (Vazzano 1993). After negotiations failed and
Hayes vetoed four different appropriations bills, the ultimate result was the extraction
of concessions from Hayes in exchange for the riders’ removal (Vazzano 1993).
The party leadership has also historically utilized limitation riders as a means
of quickly passing substantive policy when the authorization process was either
unavailable or the policy committees were uncooperative. For example, in the 104th
Congress, despite the increase in majority party cohesion that came with the
Republican rise to power, there remained significant disagreements between the
party’s moderate members, who perceived policy-making as an incremental process,
and the more ideological members, who desired rapid policy change (Marshall, Prins
and Rohde 2003). As a result of these disagreements, the authorizing committees
were often unwilling or unable to cooperate with the leadership in fast-tracking the
Speaker’s policy priorities (Aldrich and Rohde 1997). Therefore, during this period
the Republican Party leadership chose to utilize limitations attached during both the
committee and floor processes as a tool to overcome the tensions that were emerging
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within the authorization committees and were beginning to create policy gridlock
(Marshall, Prins and Rohde 2003).
In an interview conducted by the author, former Congressman Les AuCoin (DOR), a member of the House Appropriation Committee during the 97th through the
102nd Congresses, drew a distinction between the motivations of majority versus
minority party members in proposing limitation riders. While members of the
majority propose limitations to “steal the policy-making thunder of the authorization
committee by passing policy in the form of a limitation that would not be able to be
attached to authorization bills” (AuCoin Interview, February 3, 2010), the purpose of
minority party action tends to be more closely related to position-taking. “Other than
the very real possibility of a genuine (minority) interest in policy change, a limitation
on expenditures is an enormous political weapon. If you are of the minority party, as
the Republicans were when I was in the majority, you’ve been out in the woods in the
minority since the Eisenhower years. It was a great ‘guerilla war’ tactic to have a
limitation on expenditures that might have to do with some hot button social issue and
then force the majority to go on the record about (it)…. And so, a large amount of
their (the minority party) efforts was to use it (limitation riders) in a political way to
try to set people up for tough re-election races” (AuCoin Interview, February 3, 2010).
Historically, the use of limitation riders to influence public policy has been
motivated both by inter-branch rivalries and partisan struggles. Within the House of
Representatives, while the majority party leadership has found limitation riders to be
an effective tool to combat policy gridlock and uncooperative authorizing committees,
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the minority has been able to use them strategically to attach their own policy
priorities to ‘must pass’ appropriations legislation and subject members of the majority
to recorded votes on controversial issues. Because of their policy-making implications
and usefulness to the majority and minority parties, limitations provide a valid test of
competing theories of congressional decision-making that seek to account for party
leadership power in the areas of agenda setting and voting discipline. Based upon the
rationales detailed above for individual members of the House to propose or support
the passage of limitation riders, the following section will explore the comparative
accounts that the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives provide regarding the
number of limitation riders that are proposed and passed each Congress.
Riders and Theories of Congressional Parties
Although the Procedural Cartel and CPG theories have differing conceptions
of the role of the Appropriations Committee relative to the party leadership, the
development of the appropriations process, as well as level and type of influence that
the party leadership is able to exert over decision-making outcomes, these perspectives
provide a set of both cohesive and contrasting predictions as the number, pass rate and
partisan source of limitation riders that are proposed under varying circumstances of
inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion. The most basic premise of
Procedural Cartel theory is that the parties are consistently able to exercise some
degree of control over legislative decision-making. During periods of low inter-party
polarization and intra-party cohesion, leadership influence occurs via agenda control,
the goal of which is to assure that measures sponsored by the minority or that are not
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favored by the majority do not make it to the floor for consideration. When party
polarization and cohesion are high, the majority switches its emphasis to voting
discipline, which has the effect of allowing more minority measures onto the agenda
but proportionally fewer survive the floor process. The ability to control the agenda or
create voting unity is enabled by majority party’s control over institutional
organization, through which it is able to assure committee chair compliance and the
ideological alignment of the committee members with the majority caucus
(McCubbins 1990).
In contrast, CPG theory distinguishes between the legislative context that
exists under periods of low versus high inter-party polarization and intra-party
cohesion. During periods when polarization and cohesion is low, the party leadership
has little ability to agenda set or discipline its membership and, consequently power
over the agenda devolves to the committees. Under these circumstances, it is possible
for the committees to be ideological outliers and even pass legislation that is contrary
to the caucus’ overall preferences because of the lack of agreement within the majority
party caucus on most major policy issues. Additionally, committees have procedural
abilities to limit floor amendments and protect their legislative efforts from tampering,
which results in agenda control of both majority and minority sponsored measures.
During periods of high polarization and cohesion, however, when there is greater
ideological cohesion within the caucus, power is vested in the majority party
leadership to pursue the caucus’ goals through both agenda control and voting
discipline. The leadership is therefore able to utilize rules to discourage minority and
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unfavorable majority amendments while also assuring that party discipline during the
actual vote takes place.
When accounting for why innovations in the appropriations process, such as
the 1983 change to Rule XXI, occur, the Procedural Cartel perspective argues that
they assist the majority party in furthering its caucus’ aims by assuring that the party
label in the arena of appropriations is protected (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).
According to this perspective, these changes are largely unrelated to ebbs and flows in
the amount of cohesion and polarization that exists within the majority party at the
time. The CPG perspective, however, argues that the legislative context, which
includes the electoral, partisan and policy environment, is important in producing
changes in the appropriations process (see, for example, Aldrich and Rohde 2005).
For example, the appropriations reforms that occurred in the 1970s were first
facilitated by the rise in cohesion within the House Democratic Caucus. Then, the
procedural changes that came out of these reforms paved the way for new policymaking processes, such as reconciliation, to emerge that were favorable toward the
implementation of the majority caucus policy priorities. Finally, the economic context
of two oil shocks, slowing growth, inflation, a series of tax limitation initiatives in
various states demonstrated that government programs needed to be cut back and
provided further impetus for the budgetary reforms to take place.
Based upon the above descriptions of the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives, predictions regarding aggregate as well as the partisan proposal and
passage rates of limitation riders on the floor of the House under circumstances of
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high versus low cohesion and polarization can be derived. It is important to note,
however, that despite the fact that these two perspectives provide differing accounts of
party leadership power and the causes of changes to the appropriations process, these
two approaches make some similar predictions regarding the proposal and passage of
limitation riders on the floor of the House. This circumstance is probably in large part
due to the fact that the Procedural Cartel and CPG theories agree at a basic level as to
the ability of the majority party leadership to impact outcomes utilizing the tools of
agenda control and voting discipline, and that inter-party polarization and cohesion
have an effect on the way these tools are used. The three areas of similarity and their
comparative theoretical rationales, as well as the area of difference, are summarized in
Figure 2.1 below.
Figure 2.1
Procedural Cartel and CPG Hypotheses, Proposal and Passage of Limitations on the
House Floor
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For the overall number of riders that will be proposed each Congress, both the
Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives predict parallel trends. The Procedural Cartel
perspective posits that during periods of low polarization and cohesion, party agenda
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control will produce a lower overall number of amendments being introduced. In
periods of high polarization and cohesion, the focus on voting discipline results in a
larger number of amendments from both parties being allowed onto the floor. On the
same theoretical question, CPG argues that the ability of the Appropriations
Committee to procedurally discourage limitation riders during periods of low
polarization and cohesion leads to fewer amendments. When polarization and
cohesion are high, a higher number of majority amendments are allowed on the floor
because of the majority leadership’s control over the agenda.
The Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives also make similar assertions in
predicting the aggregate proportion of riders that will pass each Congress. Procedural
Cartel theory claims that during periods when polarization and cohesion are low,
because the party leadership is focused on agenda control and not voting discipline a
greater proportion of limitations pass on the floor when compared to periods of high
polarization and cohesion, where the party leadership’s focus on voting discipline
leads to a lower proportional pass rate. For rider pass rate, the CPG perspective argues
that during periods of low polarization and cohesion, the low majority party voting
discipline leads to a higher pass rate of amendments when compared to Congresses
with high polarization and cohesion, where the greater voting discipline that has
resulted from the presence of conditional party government leads to a lower overall
pass rate of amendments.
The final area of similarity between the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives is regarding the pass rate of limitation riders for the majority versus the
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minority party. Procedural Cartel posits that under periods of low polarization and
cohesion, the lack of majority focus on voting discipline causes a pass rate that is
overall roughly equal for each group, although the actual proportion of limitations that
pass each Congress for the majority versus the minority may be somewhat
inconsistent. In contrast, when polarization and cohesion are high, the focus on voting
discipline and not agenda control means that the minority will have the opportunity to
propose riders, but the pass rate of these riders will be much lower than those
proposed by members of the majority. From the CPG perspective, during periods of
low polarization and cohesion, the lack of majority party voting cohesion leads to a
roughly equal pass rate of majority and minority riders on the whole with the
possibility that the variance in which group passes a greater proportion of limitations
each Congress would be somewhat inconsistent. During periods of high polarization
and cohesion, the voting discipline that emerges from the stronger majority party
leadership means that the majority will always have proportionally more riders pass
than the minority each Congress.
While the above three predictions made by the Procedural Cartel and CPG
theories concerning limitations differ in rationale, they lead to similar expectations in
the areas of aggregate proposal, aggregate passage and majority versus majority pass
rate. Where the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives diverge is as to which party
proposes more riders during Congresses with high versus low polarization and
cohesion. When polarization and cohesion are low, Procedural Cartel argues that the
majority party’s focus on agenda control results in the minority being able to propose
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fewer riders than the majority. CPG, however, predicts that during periods of low
polarization and cohesion, the lack of majority agenda control means that the minority
and majority will be able to propose a roughly equal number of riders on average,
although the actual pattern each Congress may be somewhat inconsistent. When
polarization and cohesion are high, Procedural Cartel theory posits that the majority
leadership’s focus on voting cohesion means that the minority party members, who
will have an incentive to propose more riders due to their lack of satisfaction with the
status quo, will have the ability to propose more riders than periods where majority
agenda control is the focus. Because the majority party should be generally satisfied
with the legislation as it exits the committees because they are ideologically aligned
with the caucus, this will result in the number of minority riders increasing so their
number exceeds those being proposed on the floor by the majority. The CPG
perspective, however, conceives of the majority leadership as being able to exercise
both agenda control and voting discipline in periods of high polarization and cohesion.
Therefore, the majority should be able to prevent many of the minority party riders
from being introduced, which results in more majority riders bring proposed on the
floor than minority riders.
Based upon the differing conceptions of leadership power and the tools the
majority party utilizes during periods of low versus high cohesion and polarization, the
Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives make contrasting predictions regarding the
amount of riders that should be successfully proposed on the House floor by each
party during varying institutional contexts. However, the similarity between the
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theories in their basic premise regarding the importance of parties for legislative
outcomes leads to similar forecasts concerning the number of riders that should be
proposed in the aggregate, as well as their overall and partisan passage rates. The
presence of similar predictions is evidence that the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives may not be as opposite as they are sometimes portrayed and provides an
opportunity to test the ability of their areas of theoretical cohesion to predict
legislative behavior. While determining the comparative accuracy of each
perspective’s underlying rational in the areas where their observable manifestations
are similar is outside the scope of this study, the upcoming analysis will still be able to
determine whether or not their areas of theoretical overlap have evidentiary support.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to lay the descriptive and theoretical
groundwork for the analysis of limitation riders that will occur in chapters three and
four. Within the evolution of the appropriations process that has occurred since the
Civil War, larger institutional competitions between the committee and the leadership
for control over the legislative process are reflected, with the Appropriations
Committee being more dominant in the earlier part of the twentieth century while the
party leadership has been increasingly resurgent since the 1970s reform era. The
ability of the party leadership to utilize the appropriations process to achieve
substantive ends through tools such as limitation riders has become more widespread
in recent years. Meanwhile, the ability of the minority party to use this tool to attach
policy that could not independently pass, or to force the majority party to go on the
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record regarding issues of controversy has continued to provide incentives for their
members to attempt to propose and pass these kinds of amendments.
The allowance of indirect policy-making within the appropriations process via
tools such as limitation riders, as well as the distinct motivations that the members of
the majority versus the minority have to use them, provides a hitherto unexplored
avenue to test the comparative predictive ability of the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives. In addition, the similarity of three out of the four predictions made by
these theories provides an additional means to evaluate these perspectives by directly
testing the proposition that polarization and cohesion impact the legislative success of
the majority and minority parties, as well as overall institutional dynamics in the
proposal and passage of floor amendments. In the following chapter, both the parallel
and competing predictions made these perspectives regarding limitation riders will be
evaluated.
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Chapter Three: Limitation Riders in the 97th through the 110th Congresses
Method and Data
This chapter utilizes a dataset of limitation riders taken from the 97th through
the 110th Congresses to test the explanatory power of the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives outlined in the previous chapter. These Congresses were selected
because, while they are after the 1970s reform period in the House, they include the
1983 modification of the rules governing floor consideration of limitation riders and
thus are able to measure the impact of that change. In addition, this time period
includes seven Congresses with low inter-party cohesion and intra-party polarization
and seven Congresses with high polarization and cohesion, both of which are
important explanatory variables for the Procedural Cartel and CPG theoretical
frameworks.
The unit of analysis for this study is each individual limitation rider proposed
on the House floor between the 97th and 110th Congress to a regular appropriations
bill, which allows for the impact of the partisanship of the bill sponsor to be accounted
for. Riders from continuing resolutions or supplementary appropriations legislation
are not included in this analysis because these types of bills are typically considered
under closed rules, making the successful proposal of a limitation rider on the floor in
this legislative context a rare occurrence. The data on individual limitation riders was
taken from the text of the amendments proposed on the House floor to all regular
appropriations bills during the period under study found in the Library of Congress
THOMAS database. Limitation amendments were identified by their procedurally
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mandated opening language “None of the funds provided in this Act may be used
for…”(Oleszek 2001, 54), resulting in a starting total of 1075 limitation riders in the
period under study. The 137 limitation riders that were withdrawn from consideration
were then removed from this total, as were the 75 amendments excluded from
consideration via point of order objections. The totals on limitation riders that were
withdrawn and subjected to successful point of order motions is included in Table A.1
in Appendix A.
The limitations sponsored by Congressman Jeff Flake (R-AZ) during the 109th
and 110th Congresses were also excluded. Between the 108th and 109th Congresses,
the total number of riders that were proposed on the floor increased from 98 to 166
and this high level was maintained with 168 limitation amendments being successfully
proposed on the floor in the 110th Congress, a dramatic swing that was in large part
due to the efforts of Flake. Elected in 2000 on a platform of anti-government waste,
Flake’s main legislative priorities involved combating earmarks and the other forms of
government spending he viewed to be unwise or excessive (Pear 2006; Ruyle 2009).
His efforts in this area and his willingness to publically criticize his own party
leadership over its spending priorities led to the stripping of his seat on the Judiciary
Committee during the 110th Congress (Fein 2007). Although Flake’s focus within the
early part of his legislative career was on removing earmarks during the floor
consideration of appropriations legislation, during the 109th and 110th Congress he
widened his floor tactics to include the proposal of 93 limitation riders, of which only
seven passed. The fact that this one individual Congressman is responsible for over
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one-half of the limitation riders proposed by members of the Republican Party during
the 109th and 110th Congresses significantly distorts the data on the phenomenon under
study. In addition, the fact that the member who proposed the second largest number
of limitation riders during the period under study, Jim Trafficant, Jr. (D-OH), only
proposed a total of thirty-two riders between 102nd and 107th Congresses, adds further
support to the proposition that Flake’s legislative behavior in this area is aberrant.
After excluding the limitations proposed by Flake during the 108th and 109th
Congresses from the group of riders to be examined, the final total was 771.
This study utilizes two dependent variables to test both the similar and
competing predictions that the Procedural Cartel and CPG approaches make regarding
patterns of limitation rider proposal and passage under varying conditions of interparty polarization and intra-party cohesion. The first dependent variable is the number
of limitation riders successfully proposed on the House floor to regular appropriations
bills during the 97th through the 110th Congresses. The second dependent variable is
the proportion of riders that passed during floor consideration of regular
appropriations legislation during each of the Congresses contained within this study.
These dependent variables are utilized because of their ability to operationalize two
important phenomena: the amount of majority party agenda control and the amount of
majority party voting cohesion that takes place within a given Congress. In
Congresses with high levels of majority-party agenda control, more majority party
limitations will be successfully proposed than minority riders; in Congresses with high
levels of majority-party voting discipline, a higher proportion of majority limitations
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will pass than minority limitations. Supportive evidence for the Procedural Cartel
perspective from these two dependent variables would be a higher number of majority
riders being introduced when polarization and cohesion is low, and a higher number of
minority riders when polarization and cohesion are high. If the number of majority
and minority riders that are proposed is approximately equal when polarization and
cohesion is low and the number of majority limitations exceeds the minority during
high polarization and cohesion, this would lend stronger support to the CPG
perspective. Both theories, however, expect to find a high rate of passage in the
aggregate and for both parties during periods of low cohesion and polarization, and a
lower aggregate but higher majority passage rate during periods of high polarization
and cohesion.
It follows, therefore, from the above discussion that the first independent
variable utilized in this study is the party of the limitation rider sponsor. Legislative
sponsors were coded first according to which party they belonged at the time of the
vote (Democratic, Republican, etc.) and were then re-coded according to whether or
not the sponsor’s party held a majority or minority of the seats in the House at the time
that the rider was proposed. Representatives Bernard Sanders (Independent) and
Bruce Vento (Democrat Labor Union) were coded according to the party with which
they caucus, which is in both cases the Democratic Party. The data source for this
variable is the Congressional Biographical Directory published by the U.S. Congress.
The second and third independent variables in this study are the level of interparty polarization and intra-party cohesion present within each Congress. Rohde’s
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(1991) initial study of conditional party government operationalized these concepts as
the number of party unity votes, where the majority of one party votes the opposite of
the majority of the other party, that occur in each Congress. Poole and Rosenthal
(1997) utilize a two-dimensional spatial model (D-NOMINATE) to map legislative
voting and measure the amount of party cohesion on a given issue. The first
dimension contains the fundamental economic issues that define and separate the
major political parties and so a high amount of party unity on these votes indicates that
the amount of polarization between the parties is also high. The second dimension
deals with regional issues that divide the parties internally, such as the question of
slavery during the Civil War era, making the level of unity of these votes indicative of
the amount of internal party cohesion that exists. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) found
that parties have typically been polarized on the first dimension and this polarization is
exacerbated when the party membership is highly cohesive on these issues. This
methodology can also be utilized to create aggregate estimates of party polarization
and cohesion for each Congress derived from both D-NOMINATE and the scores for
the more recent Congresses entitled W-NOMINATE (see Aldrich, Rohde and Tofias
2007). In this mode of analysis, the two dimensions that map the amount of interparty polarization and intra-party cohesion are maintained as distinct estimates
because combining them tends to mask where the significant areas of difference
between and within the parties occur (Aldrich, Rohde and Tofias 2007).
The operationalization of inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion
variables in the current study involves a measure that captures the distance between
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the median Democrat and median Republican on the first and second NOMINATE
dimension for each Congress. This measure is scaled between zero and one with a
higher score on the first dimension indicating a higher amount of polarization between
the two main parties. Conversely, while the second dimension is similarly scaled, a
higher score indicates a lower level of internal party ideological cohesion. These
scores are taken from the Aldrich, Perry and Rohde (2009) study, which are
numerically listed in Table A.2 in Appendix A.
Figure 3.1
Difference in Median Party NOMINATE Scores, 97th through the 110th Congresses
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the level of inter-party polarization and intra-party
cohesion during the 97th through 110th Congresses. The first-dimension measurement
of inter-party polarization during the period under study shows that the level of
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polarization is initially low and proceeds to steadily grow until the 104th Congress,
where it jumps to a relatively high level that consistently increases through the 110th
Congress. Specifically, the level of party polarization began at .586 in the 97th
Congress and grew to .728 in the 103rd Congress. Between the 103rd and 104th
Congress, the level of polarization increased almost .1 to .814, and ended up at .941
during the 110th Congress. These numbers generally indicate that the majority and
minority parties had only a moderate level of ideological distance in the first part of
the period under study, but that the amount of distance between them increased
significantly after the 103rd Congress and ended with the parties being almost entirely
separate from one another.
For the second-dimension measurement of intra-party cohesion, the amount of
ideal-point polarization began at .283 during the 97th Congress and, after initially
increasing through the 100th Congress, showed a general decline through the 110th
Congress to a level of .095. Overall, these numbers indicate that the level of intraparty cohesion was initially moderate and, after some instability between the 98th and
102nd Congresses, the general trend was toward much higher cohesion after the 104th
Congress. It is also worthwhile to note that this low level of difference between the
parties on regional issues is consistent with the increase in polarization on economic
issues, where the parties manifest their strongest differences and battles over policy
within the House are typically concentrated. The above data establish a period of low
inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion between the 97th through the 103rd
Congresses and contrasts it to the high polarization and cohesion that occurs between
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the 104th and 110th Congresses. Thus, it provides a good time period to test both
theoretical perspectives simultaneously.
The Procedural Cartel and CPG theories yield a set of three similar predictions
regarding the aggregate number of limitation riders proposed each Congress, the
overall rider passage rate and the rider pass rate for the majority versus the minority
party. First, according to these two theoretical perspectives, the total number of
limitation amendments proposed each Congress on the floor between the 97th and
103rd Congresses will be lower than the total proposed each Congress between the
104th and 110th Congresses. Second, the overall proportion of limitation riders that
pass between the 97th and 103rd Congresses will be higher than the proportion that
passes between the 104th and 110th Congresses. Third, when comparing the pass rates
of the majority versus the minority party, the parties will have roughly equal pass rates
during the period of low cohesion and polarization between the 97th and 103rd
Congress but the majority’s pass rate will exceed the minority’s as the level of
polarization and cohesion is heightened during the 104th through the 110th Congresses.
While the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives make similar predictions in
three key areas, they differ as to whether the majority or minority proposes more riders
during periods of low versus high inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion.
According to the Procedural Cartel perspective, when cohesion and polarization is
low, the majority’s utilization of agenda control results in the minority party members
proposing fewer limitation riders than the majority members. More specifically, if this
theory is correct, between the 97th and 103rd Congresses the majority party should
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propose more riders each Congress than the minority party. From the CPG
perspective, however, during periods of low polarization and cohesion, the lack of
majority agenda control gives both parties roughly equal abilities to propose floor
limitation riders, which means that if this theory is correct, between the 97th and 103rd
Congresses, the number of riders proposed by the majority and minority party
members should be roughly equal. During Congresses with high polarization and
cohesion, such as the period between the 104th and 110th Congresses, if the Procedural
Cartel perspective is more accurate, the majority focus on voting cohesion should
result in the members of the minority party having the ability to propose more riders
than under periods where majority agenda control is the focus. In contrast, the CPG
perspective posits that when cohesion and polarization is high, the majority is able to
prevent many of the minority party riders from being proposed due to their ability to
control the agenda and enforce voting discipline. If this theory is the more accurate, in
each of the Congresses between the 104th and 110th Congress, the majority party
should propose more riders than the minority party.
The parallel theoretical predictions made by the Procedural Cartel and CPG
frameworks regarding limitation rider proposal and passage can be generally
summarized by three hypotheses:
Hypothesis One: Fewer limitation riders are proposed but proportionally more
pass in Congresses with low inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion than in
Congresses with high polarization and cohesion.
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Hypothesis Two: During Congresses with low inter-party polarization and
intra-party cohesion, the limitation riders sponsored by members of the majority and
minority parties have approximately equal rates of passage.
Hypothesis Three: During Congresses with high inter-party polarization and
intra-party cohesion, the limitation riders sponsored by members of the majority party
have a greater rate of passage than the riders proposed by members of the minority
party.
The contrasting predictions made by the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives regarding limitation rider proposal and passage are contained within the
following four hypotheses:
Hypothesis Four (Procedural Cartel): During Congresses with low inter-party
polarization and intra-party cohesion, members of the majority party propose more
limitation riders than members of the minority party.
Hypothesis Five (Procedural Cartel): During Congresses with high inter-party
polarization and intra-party cohesion, the members of the minority party propose more
limitation riders than members of the majority party.
Hypothesis Six (CPG): During Congresses with low inter-party polarization
and intra-party cohesion, the number of limitation riders proposed by members of the
majority party and members of the minority party should be close to equal.
Hypothesis Seven (CPG): During Congresses with high inter-party polarization
and intra-party cohesion, the minority party members propose fewer limitation riders
than the members of the majority party.
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The data in this study is analyzed utilizing the dependent variables of
limitation rider proposal and passage rates in each of the Congresses under study along
with the independent variables of sponsor partisanship, inter-party polarization and
intra-party cohesion. The dependent variable of limitation rider passage is coded
dichotomously (pass-1, fail-0). The first and second dimension NOMINATE interparty polarization and intra-party cohesion scores are kept in continuous form ranging
from zero to one. The variable of majority status was coded dichotomously (majority1, minority-0) and used to formulate an interaction term for the impact of majority
status during the high polarization and cohesion Congresses (104th through 110th) on
the likelihood that a limitation rider would pass.
The evaluation of the shared hypotheses begins with an examination of the
aggregate numbers of limitation riders proposed and passed during the Congresses
under study. If the prediction made by Hypothesis One is correct, a smaller number of
limitation riders will be proposed in the 97th through the 103rd Congresses than the
104th through the 110th Congresses, but the riders proposed in the latter group will
have a proportionally lower rate of passage. The second piece of analysis tests the
predictions made by Hypotheses Two and Three by examining the rate of passage of
the limitation riders proposed and passed each Congress. Evidence supportive of these
hypotheses would be an approximately equal rate of passage of minority and majoritysponsored riders during the 97th through the 103rd Congresses, as well as a greater rate
of passage for riders sponsored by members of the majority party than those sponsored
by members of the minority party during the 104th and later Congresses. The third
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piece of analysis tests Hypotheses Two and Three via multinomial logistic regression
with the STATA 10 statistical package to evaluate if the level of intra-party
polarization, level of inter-party cohesion and majority party status during periods of
high polarization and cohesion significantly impact the odds that a limitation rider will
pass.
The final piece of analysis tests the four remaining hypotheses with an
assessment of the total number of limitation riders proposed by majority versus
minority party members in each of the Congresses from the period under study. If the
Procedural Cartel perspective (Hypotheses Four and Five) is correct, members of the
majority party will propose more limitation riders than members of the minority
between the 97th and 103rd Congress, while members of the minority party will
propose more riders than the majority party during the 104th through the 110th
Congress. If, however, the CPG thesis (Hypotheses Six and Seven) has better
leverage, the members of the minority will equal or exceed the number of riders
proposed by members of the majority during the 97th through the 103rd Congresses,
while members of the majority party will propose more riders than the minority
between the 104th and 110th Congresses.
Findings
Figure 3.2 illustrates the total number of proposed and passed limitation riders
during the 97th through the 110th Congresses. The drop in the number of limitation
riders between the 97th and 98th Congresses from 56 to 13 is reflective of the 1983
rules change that strengthened the ability of the floor manager from the committee to
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prevent the consideration of limitation riders with a successful motion to rise. The
impact that this change had on the number of riders proposed during that Congress is
also indicative of the amount of control that the committee itself, or the majority
leadership working through the committee, is able to exert from this point forward
over the floor process. The number of limitation riders proposed during the 98th
through the 103rd Congresses range between 13 and 24. This number dramatically
increases during the 104th Congress to 94 limitation riders and then immediately
decreases during the 105th Congress to 69. While a moderately downward trend
continues during the 106th and 107th Congresses, the number of limitation riders again
increases during the 108th Congress from 98 riders to 123 during the 110th Congress.
Figure 3.2
Limitation Riders Proposed and Passed, 97th through the 110th Congresses
140
120
100
80
60

Proposed
Passed

40
20
0

67
The pass rate of this group of limitation riders varies considerably across the
14 Congresses under study. Although between the 97th and 103rd Congresses, almost
all riders that were proposed were passed, this trend abruptly changed during the 104th
Congress with a pass rate of less than two-thirds for that time period. While a greater
proportion of riders began to pass during the 105th through the 107th Congresses, the
pass rate never approached the level of the earlier Congresses. Beginning with the
108th Congress, the proportion of limitation riders that were passed dramatically
decreased so that during the 109th and 110th Congress, less than two-thirds of the riders
proposed were passed.
The findings in Figure 3.2 are strongly supportive of the parallel Procedural
Cartel and CPG predictions contained within Hypothesis One. During the period of
low inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion between the 97th and 103rd
Congresses, with the exception of the 97th Congress, in each Congress a lower number
of limitations was proposed than in any of the 104th through 110th Congresses.
Moreover, the total number of limitation riders proposed during the 97th through the
103rd Congress was 158, versus the 619 total proposed between the 104th and 110th
Congresses. For the rate of passage during the low versus high polarization and
cohesion Congresses, out of the 158 riders proposed between the 97th and 103rd
Congresses, 139 (eighty-eight percent) passed while for the 104th through the 110th
Congresses, out of the 619 riders that were proposed only 390 (sixty-three percent)
passed. These findings are strongly supportive of the Hypothesis One prediction that
a greater proportion of riders would pass during Congresses with low inter-party
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polarization and intra-party cohesion than Congresses with high polarization and
cohesion.
Table 3.1
Limitation Riders Proposed and Passed by Party, 97th through the 110th Congresses
Congress
th

97
98th
99th
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
108th
109th
110th
Total

Riders Proposed
Majority
34
5
6
3
6
7
15
41
43
37
15
37
45
38
332

Minority
22
8
13
21
8
6
4
53
26
25
33
61
80
85
445

Riders Passed
Majority
30
4
6
3
6
7
14
34
33
24
12
22
29
28
252

Minority
15
8
12
18
7
5
4
27
20
15
22
34
46
44
277

Table 3.1 details the number of limitation riders proposed and passed in the
97th through 110th Congresses broken down by the legislative sponsor’s party while
Figure 3.3 illustrates the passage rate for the limitation riders proposed by majority
party members versus the minority party members during the period under study. In
the aggregate, during the 14 Congresses contained within the study, 252 out of the 332
limitation riders that were proposed by members of the majority party passed while
277 out of the 445 riders proposed by members of the minority party passed. When
comparing the total number of riders that were proposed by these two groups of
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members, the minority failed to pass 158 total limitation riders, almost twice as many
as the 80 limitation amendments that the majority failed to pass.
Figure 3.3
Percentage of Limitation Riders Passed by Party, 97th through the 110th Congresses
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In evaluating the difference between the majority and minority limitation rider
pass rates during periods of low polarization and cohesion, the data in Figure 3.3
indicates that between the 97th and 103rd Congresses, the pass rate of the majority
versus the minority is somewhat inconsistent. While the minority had a perfect rate of
passage for the 98th and 103rd Congresses, the majority exceeded its rate of passage in
the 97th, 99th, 100th, 101st and 102nd Congresses. Supplementing this data with the
numbers found in Table 3.1, during this period the members of the minority party
proposed a total of 82 limitation riders and passed 69 of them while the majority
proposed a total of 76 limitation riders and passed 70 of them. Overall, the difference
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between the majority and minority’s average pass rate is only eight percent, with a
92% pass rate for the majority and an 84% pass rate for the minority. This evidence is
generally supportive of Hypothesis Two, which predicts that during periods of low
inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion, the majority and minority-sponsored
limitation riders will have roughly similar pass rates. Although for four out of the
seven Congresses, the gap in pass rate between the parties was over ten percent, the
relatively small number of riders proposed by each group tends to inflate an actual
difference that is quite small.
The data in Figure 3.3 is also supportive of Hypothesis Three, which predicts
that during periods of high inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion, the pass
rate of majority riders will be greater than the pass rate of minority riders. Between
the 104th and 110th Congresses, the majority had a higher rate of passage for six of the
Congresses and equaled the minority’s pass rate in the seventh Congress. In addition,
while the minority proposed a total of 363 limitation riders during this period, which is
107 more than the majority, only 208 of these riders passed, which is only 36 more
than the majority passed during that same period. The difference between the majority
and minority party’s average pass rate is ten percent, with the majority passing 67% of
its limitation riders while the minority passed 57% of its riders. While difference
between the majority and minority pass rates in periods of high versus low cohesion
and polarization is not high in an absolute sense, the greater majority pass rate within
each Congress and the two-thirds increase in the difference between the pass rates
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between the low and high cohesion and polarization periods is generally supportive of
what this hypothesis predicted.
Table 3.2
Logistic Regression Analysis: Passage Rate by Polarization, Cohesion and Party
Sponsor, 97th through the 110th Congress

Inter-Party Polarization (First Dimension)
Intra-Party Cohesion (Second Dimension)
Majority Party (104th through 110th Cong.)

Log Likelihood
Chi-square
Pseudo R2
N
*p<0.05; **p<0.01.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Limitation Passage
Coefficient
Odds Ratio
-5.390**
.004
(2.14)
-.251
.778
(2.529)
.471**
1.601
(.172)
-462.59
47.49
0.0488
777

The results of the logistic regression test of Hypotheses Two and Three’s
predictions regarding the impact of inter-party polarization, intra-party cohesion and
the majority party status of the limitation sponsor during periods of high polarization
and cohesion on rider passage are found in Table 3.2. The polarization and cohesion
variables are the D and W NOMINATE polarization scores by Congress found in
Table A.2 and are kept in continuous form. The dichotomous majority party variable
was tested during the 104th through 110th Congresses only through the creation of a
variable that captures the interaction of majority party status with high polarization
and cohesion. Inter-party polarization is found to lower the odds that a rider will pass
with a coefficient that is highly statistically significant. In addition, during periods of
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high polarization and cohesion, if the legislative sponsor is a member of the majority
party, this also significantly raises the odds that a limitation will pass. While these
findings lend strong support to the shared Procedural Cartel and CPG Hypotheses Two
and Three, it is important to note that the variable of intra-party cohesion was not
statistically significant and that the pseudo R2 of 0.0488 indicates this model is limited
in its ability to fully account for why limitation riders passed or failed in the period
under study. Despite the model’s limitations, however, the statistically significant
performance of the polarization and majority party variables in the direction that
Hypotheses Two and Three predict lends support to the proposition that the patterns
observed in the data are not coincidental and can be at least be partially accounted for
via the parallel predictions made by the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the number of riders proposed by the majority versus
minority party members during the 97th through the 110th Congresses. For the period
of low inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion between the 97th and 103rd
Congress, the Procedural Cartel perspective and Hypothesis Four predicts that the
majority party members will propose more riders than minority party members. In
contrast, CPG and Hypothesis Six posit that during periods of low polarization and
cohesion, the majority and minority should have a roughly equal numbers of riders
proposed. The data contained within Figure 3.4 indicates that in the aggregate,
between the 97th and 103rd Congresses the minority and majority proposed similar
numbers of limitation riders with the majority proposing 76 and the minority
proposing 82. In only two out of the seven Congresses, did the majority exceed the
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minority in the number of riders its member proposed, in three out of the seven
Congresses, the number of limitation riders proposed by the majority versus the
minority party members were only separated by one rider and in the remaining two
Congresses, the minority exceeded the minority in the number of riders its members
proposed. These findings suggest greater support for Hypothesis Six than Hypothesis
Four and are generally supportive of the CPG prediction that members of the minority
and majority would propose roughly equal numbers of riders on the floor during
Congresses with low cohesion and polarization where the committees are able to
control the floor agenda and dissuade amendments from both parties.
Table 3.4
Number of Limitation Riders Proposed by Party, 97th through the 110th Congresses
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The data found in Figure 3.4 also speaks to the contrasting expectations of
Hypothesis Five (Procedural Cartel), which predicts that members of the minority will
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propose more riders during high polarization and cohesion Congresses than the
members of the majority, and Hypothesis Seven (CPG), which predicts that members
of the majority will propose more riders during high polarization and cohesion
Congresses than the members of the minority. Between the 104th and 110th
Congresses, members of the majority party proposed 256 limitation riders while the
minority party members proposed 363 riders. In addition, the majority party members
proposed more limitation riders than the minority in five out of the seven Congresses
under study. It is also worthwhile to note that between the 107th and 110th Congresses,
the difference in the number of riders proposed by members of the majority and
minority steadily increased, from 18 riders in the 107th Congress to 47 riders in the
110th Congress. The findings in this analysis suggest stronger support for Hypothesis
Five and the Procedural Cartel perspective than Hypothesis Seven and the CPG
perspective. Moreover, when inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion were
especially high in the latter four Congresses, the level to which the number of minority
riders exceeded majority riders increased in each Congress. This is particularly
supportive of the proposition that as polarization and cohesion increase, the majority
will focus less and less on agenda control.
The data contained within Table 3.1 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggest strong
support for the parallel predictions made by the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives contained within Hypotheses One, Two and Three. The overall trends of
rider proposal and passage, both in terms of aggregate totals and within each
Congress, conform to the predictions of both theories, that fewer limitation riders
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would be proposed but these riders would have a higher pass rate during Congresses
with low inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion when compared with
Congresses that have high amounts of polarization and cohesion. Only the 97th
Congress had as many riders proposed as any of the 104th through 110th Congresses
and this discrepancy can be accounted for via the rules change that occurred in the 98th
Congress, which was indicative of stronger agenda control being exerted by either the
committees or the leadership. The data on limitation rider pass rate by party is also
supportive of the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives, that the majority and
minority limitation riders would have a similar rate of passage during low polarization
and cohesion Congresses but the majority would have a higher passage rate during the
high polarization and cohesion Congresses. This was true of the aggregate numbers,
where the majority and minority average rates of passage were separated by six
percent between the 97th and 103rd Congresses versus the ten percent higher rate of
passage for the majority party riders between the 104th and 110th Congresses.
Although a larger difference between the rates of passage in the low versus high
cohesion and polarization periods would have lent stronger support to these two
hypotheses, the small number of riders during the low cohesion period makes the
difference in the rate of passage between the two parties, which was in fact only six
limitation riders, seem much larger than it really is.
The results of the statistical analysis located in Table 3.2 are also supportive of
the shared theoretical predictions made by Hypotheses Two and Three. Inter-party
polarization and Majority party membership both were statistically significant, with
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majority party membership increasing the odds of a rider’s passage and inter-party
polarization lowering the odds of a rider’s passage. However, the lack of statistical
significance for the inter-party cohesion variable is problematic for the predictions
made by these hypotheses, as is the low pseudo R2 for the model. Nevertheless, the
results of this analysis when combined with the raw and cross tabulated data lend
support to the proposition advanced by both the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives that the amount of inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion
significantly impacts the likelihood that limitation riders will be proposed on the floor
and consequently passed.
The comparative evidence for the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives
contained within Figure 3.4 is clearly delineated by the institutional context present
within each Congress. While during the period of low inter-party polarization and
cohesion, the evidence was most supportive of the CPG prediction that the number of
riders proposed by the majority and minority party members would be similar, the
evidence during the period of high party polarization and cohesion was most
supportive of the Procedural Cartel predictions that the minority party would propose
more riders than the minority. Some argument could be made that the trend within the
latter Congresses is more strongly supportive of the Procedural Cartel hypothesis than
the pattern of data within the earlier Congresses is supportive of the CPG predictions.
However, the fact that data within the 97th, 103rd, 104th, 107th, 108th, 109th and 110th
Congresses is supportive of the Procedural Cartel perspective while the data for the
98th, 99th, 100th, 101st, 102nd, 105th and 106th Congresses is supportive of the CPG
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perspective confirms that neither theory has the ability to fully account for the
proposal of limitations by members of the majority and minority during both kinds of
institutional contexts.
While overall, the data shows that the institutional context matters for the
number of limitations proposed and passed but does not account for the specific way
in which it matters. Moreover, in the area of theoretical contrast, this data
demonstrates that both the Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives are limited in their
ability to account for the attempts to amend legislation on the House floor. In the
concluding chapter of this analysis, the reasons for and implications of this finding is
explored.

78
Chapter Four: Conclusion
The findings in the previous chapter are generally supportive of the theoretical
proposition that the institutional context impacts the success with which the majority
and minority parties are able to propose and pass agenda items on the floor of the
House. Specifically, the aggregate number of limitations proposed and passed, as well
as the proportion of riders passed by the majority and minority parties varied
depending upon the level of inter-party polarization and intra-party cohesion present
within Congress at the time, as both the Procedural Cartel and CPG approaches
predicted. The pattern of limitation riders proposed by the majority and minority
parties, however, could not be completely accounted for by either the Procedural
Cartel or the CPG perspective. While the data in the period of low polarization and
cohesion most closely aligned with the CPG expectations, the greater number of riders
proposed by the minority when cohesion and polarization was as high, was as
predicted by the Procedural Cartel theory. This final chapter begins by discussing the
implications of the findings contained within the previous chapter for the accounts of
decision-making within the House proved by the Procedural Cartel and CPG
perspectives and concludes by discussing other theoretical explanations for these
findings not tested within this study and suggests avenues for further research.
Discussion
The major finding within this study is the inability of both the Procedural
Cartel and CPG perspectives to account for the pattern of limitation proposal on the
House floor by the majority versus the minority party. The CPG argument, that when
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polarization and cohesion is low, the committees will dominate the floor process and
have the ability to successfully dissuade amendments originating from both the
majority and minority parties, most closely aligns with the data from the 97th through
the 103rd Congresses. However, the Procedural Cartel thesis, that the majority party’s
focus on floor voting discipline (instead of agenda control) when polarization and
cohesion is high results in the minority having the ability and incentive to propose a
high number of riders, is borne out by the data from the 104th through the 110th
Congresses.
The inability of the Procedural Cartel or the CPG approaches to account for the
proposal of limitations during both kinds of institutional contexts implies that there
may be weaknesses within both theoretical frameworks. In the case of the Procedural
Cartel theory, if the majority actually controls the agenda during Congresses where
polarization and cohesion are low, more riders from the majority should be proposed
than the minority. However, the low number of limitations that members of the
majority party were able to propose during the 97th through the 103rd Congresses
appears to indicate that the majority has less ability to agenda control under
institutional contexts where polarization and cohesion are low than is argued by the
Procedural Cartel perspective. For the CPG approach, if the majority exercises
significant agenda control during Congresses where polarization and cohesion are
high, members of the majority should be more successful in proposing riders on the
floor than the minority. However, the higher number of limitations proposed by the
minority when compared to the majority, particularly during the 107th through 110th
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Congresses, suggests that majority exercises, and possibly even possesses, much less
agenda control during periods of high polarization and cohesion than it is typically
credited by this theory.
A possible objection to these findings is that limitations are an inappropriate
test of these theories because the politics surrounding their proposal and passage—and
appropriations generally—differs from the normal floor conditions under which
legislation is considered. While this might be the case if this study had utilized
earmarks or other kinds of appropriations amendments that concern distributive
politics, limitations have essentially legislative implications through the forbidding of
agency action or policy implementation. Limitations can therefore be considered to be
representative of other kinds of legislative amendments and are subject to the same
kinds of politics. A more serious objection is that the theoretical extension of the
Procedural Cartel and CPG perspectives found within this analysis is flawed. In the
case of the Procedural Cartel theory, because this framework views the party
leadership as having almost perfect control over the committees and the legislative
product that exits during periods of low polarization and cohesion, it might follow that
the appropriations legislation reported by the committees during this kind of
institutional context should align with the preferences of the party leadership, making
floor amending unnecessary. Likewise, in the case of CPG, during periods of high
polarization and cohesion, the agenda control that the majority exercises over the
committees should also result in a committee report that is equivalent to the majority
leadership’s preferences, which could eliminate the need for majority members to
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propose limitations on the floor at all. However, while agenda control might lessen
the desire of majority members that are closely aligned with the party leadership to
propose amendments, members that are in less agreement with the leadership’s goals
still have incentives to attempt to introduce limitations. Even as polarization and
cohesion increase, until there is perfect ideological alignment between each member
of the majority caucus with the party leadership, the proposal of limitations by
members of the majority should continue.
The findings within this study as to the areas where both the Procedural Cartel
and CPG perspectives fall short in their ability to account for the floor amending
process have implications for the future applicability of these theories as they
currently stand. Although both approaches are able to predict amending attempts
under one kind of institutional context, in order for these frameworks to have the
ability to provide a complete account of decision-making in the House, the basic
tenants of each theory regarding the ability of the majority leadership to control the
agenda need to be revisited, and even potentially revised.
Other Alternative Explanations and Avenues for Further Research
In addition to the theoretical areas for reconsideration outlined in the section
above, there are significant theoretical and empirical avenues for further research in
the area of limitations, appropriations and committee politics that might shed further
light on the politics of decision-making in the House. The purpose of this study was
to test two ‘party-based’ theories of congressional decision-making and in doing so, a
methodology that distinguished between members according to their partisan
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affiliation was utilized. However, another potential alternative explanation for the
findings in this study can be derived from the ‘floor-based’ Pivotal Voter perspective.
Krehbeil’s (1998) basic argument is that the capacity of politicians to enact policies is
tempered by the executive veto and the Senate filibuster procedures, which lead to the
filibuster and ideal points being the key “pivots” for congressional decision-making.
Because the members of each legislative chamber can proximately place each of their
colleagues in reference to each issue’s pivot, this leads to members structuring their
legislation strategically in order to capture that key pivot vote. Extrapolating from this
perspective, it is possible that the purpose of limitation riders is to move a piece of
legislation along the ideological spectrum so that it either aligns with the pivotal voter,
or sabotages the bill so that the pivotal voter will vote against it. The methods utilized
to test the Pivotal Voter argument examine member voting behavior not in reference to
partisan affiliation, but each individual’s position on a one-dimensional ideological
scale. While the methods in this study are unable to test this thesis, a future study that
plots the position of each amendment along a single-dimensional ideological space
and then examines how each member tends to vote on these issues relative to their
own one-dimensional ideal point could potentially shed light on the amount of party
influence that actually occurs in these votes, and how much party discipline is actually
taking place in various institutional contexts. In addition, information on the
ideological position of members that tend to sponsor limitation riders could also help
to clarify the possible motives behind their introduction.
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Another possible explanation for the trends found within this study is the
presence or absence of divided government. Oleszek (1991) has noted that the longstanding trend of divided government has encouraged the rise of a more confrontation
style of politics in Congress, where the minority party has the incentive to attack the
majority in many different policy arenas and to do so in ways that attempt to alter the
parliamentary context. In addition, relations between the President and Congress are
also affected as each branch attempts to maintain power by blocking or delaying the
other (Oleszek 1991). As divided government has a negative impact on the passage of
“landmark legislation” (Howell, Adler, Cameron and Reimann 2000), it is possible
that during these periods limitation riders provide an effective means of circumventing
policy gridlock and increasing the veto bargaining advantages of Congress relative to
the opposition executive. During these periods, limitation riders could also provide a
weapon to the minority party to attack the majority on controversial issues. There is
some evidence for this perspective, particularly during the 104th Congress, where the
number of limitation riders increased with the onset of divided government and
remained at high levels relative to previous periods through the 106th Congress.
However, the overall increases and decreases in numbers of limitation riders proposed
and passed during the entire period contained within this study do not consistently
coincide with changes in divided and unified government. In addition, the new
appearance of unified government in the 107th Congress did not appear to have a
consistent influence in decreasing the proposal of riders, either aggregately or for the
different parties. It is possible, however, that divided government in combination with
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a Republican majority has a greater impact than divided government with a
Democratic majority, but there is limited data with which to test this theory as
limitation riders on the floor were not a widespread occurrence until the 1970s.
A final alternative explanation for the number of limitation riders proposed and
passed in a given year is their legislative environment. Kiewiet and McCubbins
(1985) have noted that appropriations tend to be in larger amounts during election
years than non-election years and prevailing economic conditions, such as the amount
of inflation and unemployment, also tend to influence the level of appropriations that
occur. The partisan context is also significant for budgetary decisions, with a
Democratic-controlled Congress tending to appropriate around eight percent per year
more than one controlled by the Republican Party (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).
Finally, the amount of controversy that the majority party’s legislative agenda
engenders might also influence a decision to resort to utilizing this tool. It is possible
that some of these context-based theories could at least partially account for the
pattern of limitation rider proposal and passage found within this study, particularly
those premised on which party controls the House because limitations can be
perceived as an effective way to curb ‘wasteful’ government spending (see Aldrich
and Rohde 2009). One might therefore expect that Republicans would tend to attempt
limitations more often than Democrats, particularly when they are in the minority.
There is some evidence for this perspective as Republicans proposed more limitations
than Democrats in 10 out of the 14 Congresses under study. However, to thoroughly
test these kinds of explanations, what occurs within the committees during differing
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types of party rule and whether or not the policy content of the riders aligns with the
issues of the day must be examined.
While the Pivotal Voter, divided government and contextual theories
summarized above might provide additional insight into the proposal and passage of
limitations on the House floor, as well as the broader validity of various theories of
Congressional decision-making, these explanations require additional analysis is
outside the scope of this study. Another significant area for further research is the
extent that the rules under which an appropriations bill is considered affect the
likelihood that limitation riders will be successfully attached. The drop in the number
of limitation riders between the 97th and 98th Congress, which was the result of a
change in House rules, demonstrated the significant impact that the procedural context
can have on the ability of these amendments to be successfully proposed on the House
floor. Based upon these findings, while it seems probable that party leadership
utilization of special rules would also have a considerable effect on the number and
predominate partisan sponsorship of limitation riders that are successfully proposed,
further study is needed to isolate the exact relationship between the two variables and
the potential differences in how they operate for members of the majority and minority
party.
Another area of inquiry is the relative proportion of limitation riders attached
by the majority on the floor versus the number attached in committee. While relations
between the majority party and the Appropriations Committee was indirectly
examined in this study via the data on floor amending activity, a full study of
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committee patterns in limitation rider proposal and passage would more thoroughly
clarify the changing nature of their interactions. If the number attached in committee
is inversely related to the number proposed and attached on the floor by the majority,
this would lend further support for the CPG approach. However, if the number
attached in the committee shows greater consistency across varying conditions of
polarization and cohesion, this would suggest that the Procedural Cartel framework is
potentially more valid.
A final area to be examined in the future is the extent to which limitation riders
are more likely to be attached to certain types of appropriations bills. Might the
agency to which funds are being appropriated and the consequent policy areas that
limitation riders can influence potentially make certain bills more appealing targets
than others? The challenge of examining this possibility is that appropriations
legislation does not typically (except in the cases of Defense and Interior) allocate
funds to only one agency. And even in the case of agency appropriations that are
typically packaged with other groups, the pattern is not consistent over time and thus,
looking at the bills themselves is not a fruitful way of examining this question. In
addition, while it might be possible to look at the individual appropriations account to
which a limitation rider is attached and discern which agency is targeted, riders that
are attached in such a way as to limit all of the accounts contained within a bill would
have to be excluded from this kind of analysis.
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Conclusion
This study has utilized limitations as a means of empirically testing the
Procedural Cartel and CPG theories of congressional decision-making. The evidence
from the analysis of the insertion of limitations into appropriations legislation on the
floor indicates that the institutional context is significant in determining the amount of
power that the majority leadership holds and the tools that can be utilized to pursue its
agenda. However, while there is some evidence of party leadership control over
decision-making during Congresses with low polarization and cohesion, it appears that
during these periods, the leadership’s ability to agenda control is limited by the lack of
majority party cohesion that exists and the power that the committees wield.
Additionally, during periods of high cohesion, while the majority party leadership may
possess more power to influence voting outcomes, its ability or choice to utilize
agenda control appears to be limited. These findings suggest that both the Procedural
Cartel and CPG perspectives on the power that the majority party leadership possesses
over the agenda during varying institutional contexts do not conform to what actually
occurs during the floor portion of the legislative process. While further research is
needed to clarify the extent to which the basic tenants of the Procedural Cartel and
CPG theories regarding party government and agenda control need to be revised, it is
clear that, at the very least, both of these perspectives on the influence of parties on
decision-making in the House must be revisited.
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Appendix A
Table A.1
Limitation Rider Proposal and Passage Rate by Party, 97th through the 110th
Congresses
Congress
97th
Majority
Minority
98th
Majority
Minority
99th
Majority
Minority
100th
Majority
Minority
101st
Majority
Minority
102nd
Majority
Minority
103rd
Majority
Minority
104th
Majority
Minority
105th
Majority
Minority
106th
Majority
Minority
107th
Majority
Minority
108th
Majority
Minority
109th
Majority
Minority
110th
Majority
Minority
Total

Failed
11
4
7
1
1
0
1
0
1
3
0
3
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
33
7
26
16
10
6
23
13
10
14
3
11
42
15
27
50
16
34
51
10
41
245

Passed
45
30
15
12
4
8
18
6
12
21
3
18
13
6
7
12
7
5
18
14
4
61
7
26
53
10
6
39
24
15
34
12
22
56
22
34
75
29
46
72
28
44
526

Outcome
Pt. of Order
5
3
2
1
1
0
6
4
2
6
0
6
6
3
3
1
0
1
3
2
1
7
0
7
5
4
1
4
1
3
4
4
4
8
3
10
13
1
10
6
2
4
73

Total
Withdrawn
3
1
2
0
0
0
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
2
0
2
1
1
0
14
4
10
8
4
4
20
7
13
11
4
7
16
6
10
44
23
19
12
6
6
134

64
38
26
14
6
8
27
11
16
32
4
28
21
10
11
16
7
9
23
18
5
115
45
70
82
51
31
86
45
41
63
20
43
122
47
75
182
69
109
141
46
95
984
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Table A.2
Difference in Median Party NOMINATE Scores, 97th through the 110th Congresses
Congress

1st Dimension Nominate
Difference

2nd Dimension Nominate
Difference

97th
98th
99th
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
108th
109th
110th

.586
.610
.634
.654
.662
.679
.728
.814
.841
.849
.890
.912
.938
.941

.283
.282
.301
.371
.350
.337
.279
.234
.126
.157
.103
.094
.066
.095

Source: Aldrich, John H., Brittany Perry and David W. Rohde, 2009.

